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EDITORIAL
After five consecutive quarters of vigorous 
growth in the euro area, economic activity in 
the second quarter of 2007 slowed down to 
0.3% - half of the rate projected in the 
Commission's spring 2007 forecast. The 
deceleration partly reflects temporary weather-
related effects but it also signals that the euro-
area business cycle may be maturing.  
Growth in the second quarter was primarily 
driven by household consumption, which 
continued to be buttressed by a very robust 
labour market. On the other hand, investment 
growth came to a halt for the first time in five 
years, mostly due to a contraction in the 
construction sector. The contribution of net 
exports to growth turned positive on the back 
of still robust, although moderating, world 
trade. 
Looking ahead, euro-area fundamentals 
continue to be strong, business and consumer 
confidence has softened but remain high and 
would support a pick up in growth during the 
second half of the year. Nevertheless, the 
downside surprise on growth in the second 
quarter and the recent turmoil in financial 
markets have led the Commission to revise its 
growth projection for 2007 marginally 
downwards. According to our September 
interim forecast, euro-area GDP should grow 
by 2.5% for the year as a whole, slightly down 
from the 2.6% projected in the spring. The 
inflation outlook has been revised upwards 
marginally from 1.9% to 2.0% mainly due to 
higher-then-expected rises in commodity prices.  
Downside risks to the short-term outlook have 
recently increased substantially. Since the 
summer, global financial markets have been 
going through a period of serious unrest. We 
are witnessing a widespread and disorderly re-
pricing of risk after a prolonged period of 
exceptionally benign financial conditions. 
Ample global liquidity and historically low risk 
premia encouraged excessive risk-taking by 
investors. One consequence of this situation 
has been an increase in borrowing for 
residential mortgages and a boom in housing 
markets in many parts of the globe.  
The trigger for the re-pricing of risk was the 
downturn in the US housing market. As higher 
US interest rates began to bite, mortgage default 
rates have accelerated. Although the losses for 
the holders of the associated credit risk are 
likely to be relatively small in the context of the 
international financial system, investor 
confidence has been undermined by the 
emergence of exposures in unexpected 
locations. This contagion relates to the way in 
which credit risk has been securitised and 
distributed to investors via complex financial 
products. Sub-prime loans were sold by the 
originators into the secondary market, where 
they were sold on to international investors.  
Securitisation is a financing technique that 
involves the conversion of usually illiquid assets 
into marketable securities. In principle, 
securitisation helps to better allocate credit risk 
and thereby contributes to financial stability and 
economic performance. However, the crisis has 
raised several issues linked to the distribution of 
risk and the associated lack of transparency.  
The first issue relates to the measurement of the 
credit risk in a situation of ever-more complex 
financial instruments. It now seems that model-
based valuations for these instruments may 
have underestimated the risks from exposure to 
sub-prime mortgages.  
A second issue relates to the management of 
the credit risk linked to sub-prime mortgages. 
Investor uncertainty about the extent of 
exposures to this risk was compounded by the 
emergence of exposures in unexpected places. 
It has become evident that many US and 
European banks have exposures to the US 
mortgage market via special investment 
vehicles. This process has created uncertainty 
about counterparty risk among participants in 
the interbank markets. As a result, the crisis of 
confidence has spread to the interbank markets 
and central banks have been required to 
safeguard the functioning of these markets.   
A third problem relates to transparency within 
the financial system. The intervention of central 
banks has stabilized the situation, but the 
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functioning of money markets has not yet 
returned to normal. With market participants 
unable to identify exposure to losses, there has 
been a generalised loss of investor confidence.  
The evolution and duration of the current crisis 
is difficult to predict and will depend on the 
eventual scale and distribution of losses as they 
gradually emerge as well as on their impact on 
confidence. In any event, credit conditions will 
tighten as a result of the re-pricing of risk and 
this will have an impact on major economic 
actors in the euro-area economy in 2008. 
Downside risks to the short-term outlook will 
also depend on the extent of the economic 
slowdown in the US and possible contagion 
effects to the euro area via the trade and 
confidence channels.  
When assessing the potential impact of these 
developments on growth, it is important to bear 
in mind that the fundamentals of the euro-area 
economy remain solid. In particular, strong 
earnings performance in recent years has 
provided euro-area banks with a significant 
financial buffer. Wage moderation has boosted 
the profitability of non-financial corporations. 
A strong labour market should continue to 
support consumer spending. Finally, as 
documented in this report, there are also signs 
that the euro-area economy has become 
somewhat more resilient to shocks, partly 
thanks to an improved macroeconomic 
framework. Overall, tighter credit conditions 
can be expected to slow economic growth 
somewhat next year, but the impact is expected 
to be moderate.  
The recent financial turmoil should on no 
account be seen as undermining the rationale 
for financial integration in the euro area. Rather, 
it buttresses the case for strengthening financial 
supervision and transparency in the face of 
growing complexity of financial instruments. 
But the benefits that stem from financial 
integration should not be overlooked. There is 
ample theoretical and empirical evidence that 
shows a causal link between financial 
development and economic growth. As 
discussed in the focus section of this report, the 
euro area has a special stake in further financial 
integration as an integrated financial market can 
help the economy to function more smoothly 
and to better adjust to country-specific 
economic shocks by increasing cross-border 
risk sharing among euro-area Member States.  
In principle, the single currency has the 
potential to deepen financial integration and 
facilitate international risk sharing. Indeed, 
empirical evidence indicates that risk sharing 
has increased within the euro area in the last ten 
years. However, progress has been slow and 
uneven among euro-area Member States. 
Moreover, it still compares unfavourably with 
the adjustment role played by the financial 
sector in the USA. The composition of financial 
flows might be the main culprit: whereas cross-
border bond holdings have expanded massively 
in the euro area, equity investments, which have 
a much greater potential for risk sharing, are 
still lagging behind. Therefore, further 
integration of financial markets, not least by a 
full implementation of the FSAP, should be 
decisively pursued.  
 
 
Klaus REGLING  
DIRECTOR GENERAL 
 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 5 - 
I. Economic situation in the euro area 
After five quarters of vigorous growth, GDP growth decelerated to 0.3% in the second quarter, well below the 0.6% growth 
projected in the Commission's spring 2007 forecast. Growth was primarily driven by household consumption which continued 
to be underpinned by a very robust labour market. Investment growth, however, came to a halt for the first time in five years, 
mostly due to a contraction in the construction sector. The deceleration of GDP in the second quarter may reflect exceptional 
weather and statistical effects but also indicates that the business cycle is maturing and may have passed its peak. Business 
confidence has softened but is still high and growth during the rest of the year will remain supported by sound fundamentals. 
According to the Commission's September interim forecast, GDP growth in the euro area is projected to average 2.5% in 
2007. Nevertheless, downside risks have increased on the back of the recent financial market turbulence and the worsening 
growth outlook of the US economy. 
Coming after a protracted period of exceptionally benign financial conditions, recent financial turbulence has shaken investor 
confidence and will probably cause tighter credit conditions. Looking into the effects of tighter credit conditions on the balance 
sheets of the main economic sectors, it seems that past earnings growth should provide an adequate buffer for banks. However, 
the re-pricing of risk is likely to impact both the performance of banks and their lending activity and is also likely to affect 
euro-area companies which will face rising debt ratios and debt-servicing costs. Despite the record levels of debt accumulated in 
recent years, the impact on the household sector, which is a net saver, is difficult to predict. However, housing markets are 
likely to be negatively affected by the change in the financial environment.  
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1  
Growth surprises on the downside in the 
second quarter of 2007 
Economic activity in the euro area, which had 
shown vigorous growth since the beginning of 
2006, decelerated during the second quarter of 
2007. Quarter-on-quarter GDP growth eased 
from 0.7% in the first quarter to 0.3% in the 
second quarter. This is well below the 0.6% 
growth projected in the Commission's spring 
2007 forecast. The countries which surprised on 
the downside are France, Italy and the 
Netherlands. Growth in Germany and Spain, 
however, was in line with projections. 
The deceleration in GDP growth in the second 
quarter should be interpreted with caution as 
several factors seem to have been at play. 
Production in the euro area has clearly been 
affected by weather conditions. Both the 
agricultural and construction sector experienced 
very strong growth in the first quarter of 2007 
due to unusually mild winter weather and this 
spurt in activity was followed by a relapse in the 
second quarter. The downside surprise on GDP 
growth in the second quarter was also at odds 
with survey data which did not foreshadow any 
                                                     
1  The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 28 September 2007. 
substantial deceleration in activity. Upward 
revisions of the Q2 estimate in the forthcoming 
months cannot therefore be excluded. 
Nevertheless, besides statistical and weather 
effects, the disappointing second quarter outturn 
might also be an indication that the economy 
may have passed its cyclical peak.  
Graph 1: Contributions to real GDP growth, euro area 
(q-o-q contributions in % points – 2006 Q3 to 2007 Q2) 
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Source: Commission services. 
As regards the GDP components, the 
contribution of domestic demand (excluding 
inventories) weakened to 0.3%, compared to 
0.6% in the previous quarter. The contribution 
of net trade, however, turned positive after 
mildly contracting in the previous quarter.   
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Private consumption replaces investment as 
the main engine of growth 
After a flat reading in the first quarter of 2007 
due to VAT-related effects in Germany, private 
consumption increased by 0.5% in the second 
quarter, becoming the main engine of growth. 
Except for the VAT-related relapse in the first 
quarter of 2007, private consumption has been 
on a broad 2% growth path since the beginning 
of 2006.  
In the last few quarters, household spending has 
clearly been buoyed up by continuous 
improvement in the labour market. The 
unemployment rate started declining in 2005 and 
is now at its lowest level since the series began in 
1993. In July 2007, the unemployment rate stood 
at 6.9% of the labour force, almost a full 
percentage point lower than a year earlier. The 
ebbing of unemployment has been the result of 
rapid employment growth. Employment in the 
euro area increased by 0.5% (quarter-on-quarter) 
in the second quarter of 2007 and employment 
growth was revised upwards both in the first 
quarter (from 0.4% to 0.6%) and in the last 
quarter of 2006 (from 0.3% to 0.4%). These 
figures clearly suggest a very strong labour 
market with employment now expanding by 
1.7% year-on-year. Looking ahead, employment 
expectations decreased somewhat in September 
in the services sector but remain very high, 
indicating that the strong momentum will persist 
in the months to come.   
More recently, developments in households’ 
disposable income have provided another 
positive note. While it failed to pick up in 2006, 
despite robust economic recovery, y-o-y growth 
in nominal disposable income accelerated from 
3.3% to 4.5% during the first quarter of 2007 
(last available data). This is the highest growth 
rate since 2001. The acceleration reflected a pick 
up in employees' compensation (likely due to an 
acceleration of the wage rate) as well as a lower 
growth in taxes. However, growth in disposable 
income exceeded growth in nominal 
consumption (3.2% y-o-y) in the first quarter of 
2007, which resulted in higher savings. The 
euro-area savings ratio has been on an upward 
path since the beginning of last year and rose 
further from 14.1% in the last quarter of 2006 to 
14.4% in the first quarter of 2007.  
The few consumption-related indicators 
available for August or September point to 
continued although moderate growth in private 
consumption in the next few months. After 
reaching its highest level since 2001 in May 2007, 
consumer confidence softened somewhat over 
the summer while remaining at a high level. 
More worryingly, confidence among managers in 
the retail trade sector, after strengthening in 
August, declined sharply in September. The fall 
was due to a significant worsening in retailers' 
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 2006 Q3 
2006 
Q4 
2007 
Q1 
2007 
Q2 
Carryover 
to 2007 2007 (2) 2008 (2) 
 Percentage  change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.3 2.2 2.6 2.5 
Private consumption 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.1 2.1 2.4 
Government consumption 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.1 1.6 1.8 1.8 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.7 1.7 2.0 -0.2 4.2 4.4 3.6 
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.7 0.5 
Exports of goods and services 1.1 3.1 0.8 1.1 4.9 6.7 6.0 
Imports of goods and services 1.9 1.6 0.9 0.6 3.9 6.7 6.2 
 Percentage point contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.2 1.3 
Government consumption 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 
Changes in inventories 0.3 -0.5 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.0 
Net exports -0.3 0.7 -0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.0 
(1) Annual change in %.         (2) European Commission spring 2007 forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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assessment of both the present and expected 
business situation. The retail confidence 
indicator tends, however, to be relatively poorly 
correlated with private consumption growth and 
the fall should therefore be interpreted 
cautiously.  
Graph 2: Consumer confidence, euro area 
(Balance in % – Jan 2000 to September 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Data on loans to the private sector provide a 
mixed picture with sustained, but moderating, 
growth in credit to households. The latest 
available MFI data from the ECB show 
sustained annual growth of loans to households 
in August, both for mortgages (8.1%) and for 
consumer credit (5.7%). Nevertheless, the 
annual growth rate of loans to households has 
been on a moderately decelerating path since the 
middle of last year with both lending for house 
purchase and consumer credit showing signs of 
softening. The trend continued in the second 
quarter of 2007 and, based on data for July and 
August, also at the beginning of the third 
quarter.  
Recent price developments have also been 
supporting consumption. Annual HICP inflation 
remained below 2% in the second quarter (1.9% 
on average). In August, it even decreased to 
1.7%. As oil prices rose strongly during the 
summer of 2006, favourable base effects in 
energy prices largely accounted for the limited 
increase in energy inflation in the past few 
months. However, unfavourable base effects 
have put some upward pressure on headline 
inflation as from September, where annual 
HICP reached 2.1%.  
Investment growth hit by construction 
weakness 
After a long period of robust expansion, growth 
in gross fixed capital formation came to a halt in 
the second quarter of 2007 (-0.2% q-o-q). This is 
the first recorded contraction of investment in 
five years, albeit a modest one. A deceleration of 
investment was to be expected after the 
impressive growth registered in the first quarter 
(2% q-o-q). At the time, construction 
investments had been lifted by exceptionally 
mild winter weather and some correction was to 
be expected for the second quarter.  
While the breakdown of investment spending by 
sector is not yet available for the second quarter 
of 2007, it appears that developments in 
construction investments are indeed the main 
reason behind the strong deceleration in gross 
fixed capital formation. Value added in the 
construction sector, which is a good proxy for 
spending in construction, contracted by 1.6% (q-
o-q) in the second quarter of 2007, after 1.9% 
growth in the previous quarter. Except for 
Belgium, all euro-area countries for which data is 
available experienced a fall in construction value 
added.  
The recent drop in construction is probably 
largely attributable to weather-related effects. 
However, it may also reflect a cooling-off of the 
housing market. Recent developments in 
residential construction are not easy to assess as 
the breakdown of total construction into 
residential and non-residential is only available 
up to the first quarter. Residential investment 
experienced a significant deceleration in the 
second half of 2006 but rebounded strongly in 
the first quarter of 2007. A clearer indication of 
the cooling-off of residential investment is 
provided by data on residential building permits 
which have been experiencing a substantial fall 
since January 2006 (Graph 3).  
For the aggregate construction sector the picture 
provided by the most recent hard and soft data 
remains reasonably satisfactory. The European 
Commission's indicator of confidence in the 
construction sector, while trending slightly 
downwards, remains at a historically high level. 
Moreover, data on construction output for July 
suggest that the third quarter has not started on 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area III/2007 
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an overly weak note. Therefore, the downward 
trend in residential construction seems to be in 
part compensated by continued strong non-
residential construction.  
Graph 3: Residential building permits, euro area 
(Index 2000=100 – Jan 1999 – June 2007) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Combining data on total investment with 
estimates of construction spending suggests that 
equipment investment (which accounts for half 
of total investment) grew healthily in the second 
quarter (about 1.2% q-o-q), though more 
moderately than in the first quarter (2.1%).  
Recent loan data are suggestive of continued 
strength in corporate investment. The annual 
growth rate of loans to non-financial 
corporations continued to increase in the second 
quarter and data for July and August indicate a 
further slight acceleration at the beginning of the 
summer (13.6% and 14.2% in August, up from 
13.3% in June). Some caution is however 
necessary when assessing the implications of this 
data for investment during the second half of 
the year. First, there is some evidence that part 
of the recent acceleration in the demand for 
loans in the corporate sector is driven by merger 
and acquisition activity rather than by fixed 
capital investment. Second, the latest available 
loan data only cover the beginning of the recent 
financial turbulence and there is still much 
uncertainty as to the likely impact of this 
turbulence on credit demand and supply.  
World trade: still supportive but softening 
gradually 
There were some further signs of a softening of 
world trade in the second quarter. According to 
the latest estimates of the CPB Netherlands 
Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis, world 
trade increased by 7.2% (y-o-y) in the second 
quarter of 2007, down from 7.8% in the 
previous quarter. While year-on-year growth 
remained strong, the lower momentum was 
clearly visible in the quarter-on-quarter data. 
Indeed, world trade in the second quarter 
 Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2006-2007 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser 5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 100.4 -0.08 92.9 52..8 55.0 96.8 -6.9 25.8
Trough in latest 
downturn 89.3 -0.91 98.1 46.4 47.7 90.3 -26.5 -28.5
September 2006 108.9 1.37 107.0 56.6 56.7 99.0 5.0 -22.2
October 2006 110.0 1.34 107.3 57.0 56.5 99.3 2.4 -27.4
November 2006 109.9 1.48 107.4 56.6 57.6 100.2 4.1 -28.5
December 2006 109.8 1.54 107.5 56.5 57.6 102.5 2.4 -19.0
January 2007 109.2 1.34 107.5 55.5 57.9 103.2 1.1 -3.6
February 2007 109.7 1.51 107.6 55.6 57.5 102.6 2.0 2.9
March 2007 111.1 1.51 107.7 55.4 57.4 103.2 -1.0 5.8
April 2007 111.0 1.59 107.8 55.4 57.0 104.2 2.3 16.5
May 2007 112.1 1.50 108.0 55.0 57.3 104.7 3.9 24.0
June 2007 111.7 1.52 108.1 55.6 58.3 102.8 6.5 20.3
July 2007 111.0 1.33 107.9 54.9 58.3 101.7 4.5 10.4
August 2007 109.9 1.37  54.3 58.0 100.4 2.8 -6.9
September 2007 107.1 1.09  53.2* 54.0* 98.7 1.5 -18.1
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator. 4) Reuters 
Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Business expectations, West Germany. 7)  
National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment, Germany 
*These are flash estimates 
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increased by a modest 0.6% (q-o-q), compared 
to 1.5% in the first quarter of 2007 and about 
2.5% during the second half of 2006. The loss in 
momentum owes much to a contraction of US 
imports (-1% q-o-q in Q2 after 0.4% in Q1) but 
there is evidence that imports into emerging 
economies have decelerated as well.  
Although on a downward trend, the momentum 
in world trade is still supporting growth in the 
euro area. Euro-area export growth accelerated 
in the second quarter (1.1% q-o-q, compared to 
0.8% in the first quarter), while import growth 
decelerated (from 0.9% to 0.6%). As a result, the 
contribution of net exports to growth turned 
positive (+0.2%) after mildly contracting in the 
previous quarter. The fall in import growth was 
mainly the result of developments in Germany, 
where imports strongly decreased after a few 
quarters of buoyant growth.  
Looking ahead, developments in the global 
economy will very much depend on the course 
of events in the US economy and in financial 
markets.2 The financial market turbulence has 
taken place at a time of a strong, though 
moderating, global economy and of weakening 
household spending in the US. US GDP growth 
rebounded in the second quarter (0.8%) after a 
weak first quarter (0.2%). Personal consumption 
expenditure, however, decelerated sharply in the 
second quarter. Rising petrol prices in the spring 
were an important reason behind this, but the 
                                                     
2  See section I.2 on 'Recent financial turbulence and the 
effect on the real economy'. 
continued weakening of the housing market may 
also have started to play a role. Residential 
investment continued to be a drag on US 
economic growth, although less so than in the 
first quarter. The downturn in the housing sector 
now seems to have become more protracted and 
to weigh more heavily on overall activity than 
previously thought. Therefore, GDP growth in 
the US should remain subdued for longer than 
expected in the Commission spring forecast.  
Turning to the months ahead, recent survey 
indicators of the world economy point to a 
period of solid, though probably more moderate, 
growth than during the first half of the year. The 
July reading of the quarterly World Economic 
Survey indicates an improvement of 
expectations for the next six months. It should 
be noted, however, that this survey was 
conducted before the recent financial market 
turbulence. In contrast, the September Global 
Manufacturing PMI (released more recently) was 
somewhat less optimistic, pointing to a 
deceleration of growth in the global 
manufacturing sector in the third quarter and 
continued softening in the rate of expansion of 
new orders. 
Overall, global economic growth seems a little 
less bright than in the previous quarter. As a 
result of the financial market turbulence, 
downside risks to the global economic outlook 
have clearly increased, but clearly more so for 
2008 than for 2007. In the third quarter, world 
 
Table 3: Real GDP growth  
(Interim forecast September 2007) 
 
Quarterly GDP forecast 
(%, quarter-on-quarter)  
Annual GDP forecast 
(%, year-on-year) 2007 
 2007/1 2007/2 2007/3 2007/4 Spring forecast May 2007 
Interim 
forecast  
Sept. 2007 
Germany 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 2.5 2.4 
Spain 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.6 3.7 3.7 
France 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.5 2.4 1.9 
Italy 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 1.9 1.9 
Euro area 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.5 2.6 2.5 
(1) Data for 2007/1 and 2007/2 are estimates released by Eurostat. Where possible, the quarterly growth rates are working-day and 
seasonally-adjusted, whereas the annual projections are unadjusted. 
Source: Commission services. 
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trade should keep expanding at a healthy pace, 
though less rapidly than in previous quarters.  
Survey data: first signs of the knock-on effect 
of the financial crisis on sentiment?  
While remaining remarkably high, business 
confidence indicators have started showing some 
signs of weakening, reflecting the fact that the 
business cycle has become more mature and – 
possibly – the negative impact of recent financial 
turbulence on corporate sentiment. After a slight 
increase in August, the European Commission's 
Business Climate Indicator for the euro area fell 
significantly in September (Graph 4). This was 
the result of a less optimistic assessment of the 
past production trend and of order books. 
Managers’ production expectations also 
deteriorated somewhat. The Reuters PMI index 
for manufacturing activity shows an even clearer 
turnaround. The flash estimate for September 
saw a further decline in the euro-area 
manufacturing PMI, reaching the lowest level 
since November 2005 (Graph 4). The September 
figure suggests an acceleration of the softening 
trend experienced since June.  
Graph 4: Business confidence in manufacturing,  
euro area (Balance in % – Jan 2000 – September 2007) 
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(1) Only available to August 2007. 
Source: Commission services. 
Regarding the service sector, the European 
Commission's survey showed another 
deterioration of managers' confidence in 
September (Graph 5). As a result, the indicator 
returned to its long-term average. The decrease 
of the indicator was broad-based, reflecting a 
weakening of both backward and forward 
looking components of the survey. According to 
the latest flash estimate, Reuters Service Index 
also displayed a significant drop in September. 
The index is now back at the level last attained in 
August 2005.  
Graph 5: Business confidence in services,  
euro area (Balance in % – Jan 2000 – September 2007) 
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(1) Only available to August 2007. 
Source: Commission services. 
Most national survey indicators (NBB and IFO) 
available for September at this stage have also 
registered sizeable declines. The IFO, for 
instance, while remaining high, declined from 
105.8 to 104.2, the lowest reading since October 
2005. The sector breakdown shows a 
deterioration in manufacturing, construction and 
even stronger in the retail sector. Both the 
business current conditions and expectations 
declined.  
Overall, these developments suggest that while 
business confidence is still high, the business 
cycle is maturing and had probably passed its 
peak already before the onset of the recent 
financial turbulence. This is shown by the 
softening of sub-indicators related to past 
activity (as opposed to those related to expected 
future activity) in both the manufacturing and 
service surveys. It is indeed unlikely that 
financial turbulence had already begun to affect 
activity outside the financial sector in August 
and September. On the other hand, it is possible 
that the significant drop in the expectation 
components of business confidence registered in 
September reflects, at least in part, worries about 
the knock-on effects of the turbulence outside 
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the financial sector.3 However, with just one 
month of observations available since the 
beginning of the financial turbulence, evidence 
from confidence surveys should be interpreted 
with caution.  
Short-term outlook and risks 
According to the Commission services' interim 
forecasts released on 11 September, economic 
growth in the euro area is projected to average 
2.5% for 2007 as a whole. This represents a 
0.1 percentage point downward revision 
compared with the Commission services’ spring 
2007 forecasts. The revision is due to weaker-
than-expected growth in the second quarter and 
to the turbulence in financial markets. In the 
third and fourth quarter of 2007, GDP is 
expected to grow at 0.5%.  
Regarding prices, the forecast has been 
marginally revised upwards, with HICP inflation 
now projected to average 2.0% in 2007, i.e. 0.1 
percentage point higher than in the spring 2007 
forecast. The revision is mainly the result of 
higher-than-expected inflation in the second 
quarter and the projected impact of rising 
commodity prices towards the end of the year. 
While growth is expected to remain supported 
by sound fundamentals and a still-favourable 
global environment, downside risks to growth 
have become more prominent. First, recent 
developments in the US housing and financial 
markets have increased the risks of a sharper 
slowdown in that country. While, so far, the euro 
area seems to have been fairly resilient against 
the deterioration of economic activity in the US, 
spillovers and contagion effects could become 
significantly stronger in the event of a more 
pronounced downturn. Second, as a result of the 
financial market turbulence, downside risks to 
the global economic outlook have clearly 
increased, particularly for 2008. These 
                                                     
3  In any events, the drop in confidence about the short-
term outlook is not restricted to the financial sector. The 
financial service sector is covered by the Reuters Service 
Index but not the Commission survey on services. This 
explains the much smaller drop in confidence reported in 
September in the Commission survey. The Commission 
has also begun to publish a survey of confidence in the 
financial services sector which showed a very steep drop 
in sentiment in that sector in September.  
turbulences, if they continue for some time, will 
clearly lead to less favourable financing 
conditions and to tighter credit availability, 
reducing consumption and investment growth. 
Third, business and consumer confidence could 
be negatively affected if the crisis in the financial 
markets were to last for some time.  
These risks, if they materialise, will mainly affect 
the real economy in 2008 and beyond, but could 
already have some effects this year. They would 
come on top of the risks identified in the 
previous issue of this report, particularly a 
further appreciation of the euro, which have 
already materialised to a large extent.   
Monetary and financial conditions  
Monetary and financial conditions in the euro 
area have tightened since the onset of the crisis 
in financial markets in the summer (see 
Section I.2 in this issue for a more detailed 
analysis of the recent turmoil), but not 
substantially. The tightening has been driven 
mainly by the rise in the money market interest 
rates (3-month Euribor rate), and to a lesser 
extent by the correction in equity markets and a 
rise in corporate spreads, partially offset by a 
decline in long-term interest rates. Since mid-
August, a new rally of the euro exchange rate has 
also contributed to the tightening of monetary 
and financial conditions.  
Graph 6: Euro-area money market  
(in % – 1 Jan 2007 to 19 Sept 2007) 
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
Jan-07 Mar-07 May-07 Jul-07 Sep-07
T-bills, 3m
Euribor 3m
 
Source: Ecowin 
The tightening of monetary and financial 
conditions occurred without changes to the 
policy interest rates. Before the summer, the 
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ECB was widely expected to increase its main 
policy interest rate by 25 basis points at the 
September meeting of the Governing Council. 
However, against the background of exceptional 
market uncertainty caused by the financial 
market turbulence, the ECB Governing Council 
decided to keep interest rates unchanged. 
This market uncertainty is prominently visible in 
the euro money market where several segments 
have increasingly dried up. This can be 
witnessed, among other things, by the unusually 
wide spread between money market rates and 3-
month treasury bills (Graph 6). This spread 
widely reflects the market's perception of the 
credit risk in the money market, and the current 
levels indicate that a normalisation is still a long 
way off. The commercial paper market remains 
almost shut down, preventing financial 
institutions from accessing short-term funds. As 
a consequence, central banks all over the world 
have frequently injected liquidity into money 
markets since early August and the Fed even cut 
interest rates – first only cutting its discount rate 
by 50 basis points in mid-August, but then 
cutting 50 basis points also off its main policy 
interest rates in mid-September.  
Graph 7: 10-year government bond yields 
(in % –  1 Jan 2005 to 28 Sept 2007) 
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Source: Ecowin 
During the financial market turbulence, 
government bond yields in both the euro area 
and the US declined as investors looked for safe 
havens and changed their expectations about 
monetary policy. In the euro area, 10-year-
government-bond yields declined by around 70 
basis points between mid-July and mid-
September. At the same time, 10-year-
government-bond yields in the US dropped by 
around 80 basis points. The interest rate spread 
between the US and the euro area has thus 
narrowed to around 20 basis points, its lowest 
level since November 2004. The sharper decline 
of long-term government bond yields in the US 
during the financial market turbulence can be 
explained by changed market expectations about 
monetary policy and future GDP growth. In the 
second half of September, 10-year-government-
bond yields rebounded against the backdrop of 
the Fed's rate cut and stock market increases. 
In foreign exchange markets, the appreciation of 
the euro came to a temporary halt during the 
early stages of the financial market turbulences. 
Moreover, following a pattern that has become 
regular over recent months, jitters in other 
segments of global financial markets increased 
the risk aversion in foreign exchange markets 
and led to an unwinding of carry trades.4 With 
the US economy slowing down, actual and 
expected interest rate differentials between the 
US and the euro area are narrowing. As a 
consequence, the euro has started a new rally 
against the US dollar since mid-August, reaching 
a new record high of USD/EUR 1.418 on 28 
September. 
 Graph 8: Euro exchange rates 
(1 Jan 2005 to 28 Sept 2007) 
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4  i.e. borrowing in low interest rate countries such as Japan 
to invest in high yielding countries such as New Zealand. 
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2. Recent financial turbulence and the 
effect on the real economy  
2.1. The recent turbulence  
Benign conditions bred complacency… 
Over much of the past decade, the global 
economy has been characterised by robust 
economic growth and generally stable prices. In 
the absence of inflationary pressure, global 
liquidity has been ample and benchmark interest 
rates have remained at low levels. In 
circumstances of sustained economic growth 
and low default rates on borrowing, a decline in 
risk premia was to be expected. However, risk 
premia have been compressed to historically low 
levels as investors have assumed progressively 
higher amounts of risk in search of higher 
returns. This has led many to point to an 
increasing mis-pricing of risk and an implied 
excessive level of risk-taking by market 
participants. 
…manifested in global housing booms and 
sub-prime lending 
One specific consequence of favourable 
financing conditions has been an increase in 
borrowing for residential mortgages and a 
consequent boom in housing markets in many 
parts of the globe. Demand for housing has 
been further fuelled by a generalised relaxation 
of lending standards and by rapidly accelerating 
financial innovations that have made mortgage 
financing more accessible. In particular, the 
creation of a secondary market for mortgage 
loans in the United States has made access to 
mortgage financing possible for borrowers who 
were not previously deemed creditworthy due to 
either a lack of credit history or previous loan 
defaults. In both 2005 and 2006, lending to this 
so-called sub-prime segment of the market for 
residential mortgages represented about 20% of 
all US mortgage loan originations.  
Defaults rates in the sub-prime mortgage 
sector have picked up… 
A significant downside risk to this development 
was the potential for widespread default and 
foreclosures among these marginal borrowers in 
the event of a deterioration in the broader 
economic and/or financial conditions – which 
materialised in the course of 2007. In response 
to a resurgence in US inflation, the Federal 
Reserve has tightened monetary policy since 
mid-2004 and default rates in the sub-prime 
mortgage sector have accelerated as interest rates 
have risen. 
…impacting on the international financial 
system via risk-spreading techniques 
Sub-prime mortgage lending is much less 
prevalent in Europe and other parts of the world 
than in the United States.5 Nevertheless, 
problems in the US sub-prime lending sector 
have impacted on the international financial 
system because of the way in which the 
associated credit risks have been managed. 
Although the sub-prime mortgage loans were 
originated by US mortgage lenders and retail 
banks, these loans were sold on to other 
financial institutions in the secondary market, a 
process known as securitisation. These 
institutions bundled the sub-prime loans 
together with other loans – such as prime 
mortgage loans or loans raised by companies – 
to create collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). 
Each CDO was assessed by a credit rating 
agency, assigning different default probabilities, 
ranging from very high (junk) to very low 
(AAA), and sold on this basis to investors, 
including hedge funds, pension funds, insurance 
companies and banks. In this way, the credit risk 
associated with US sub-prime mortgage loans 
was distributed around the global financial 
system. 
In principle, securitisation and CDOs were 
thought to be attractive instruments for both 
financial institutions and investors. Securitisation 
allows an institution to use its existing loan 
portfolio to raise additional funds through the 
market, which can then be used for additional 
lending activity. This technique is also a means 
to limit the concentration of credit, interest-rate 
and market risk on banks' balance sheets by 
transferring part or all of such risks to other 
willing investors. CDOs, in turn, typically offer a 
favourable trade-off between risk and return and 
                                                     
5  There are known small sub-prime mortgage markets in 
the United Kingdom and in Ireland. 
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can be tailored to specified requirements. For 
these reasons, demand for CDOs has been high 
in recent years and the market for these 
instruments has expanded rapidly. On the other 
hand, the complexity and lack of standardisation 
in CDOs make this market opaque, relatively 
illiquid and difficult to value, in particular in 
times of market stress. Recent experience has 
shown that trading activity can even come to a 
complete halt in periods of serious market stress. 
The functioning of the CDO market is not 
widely understood and, while the market has 
weathered sporadic episodes of turbulence in the 
past, it had not previously been tested in 
conditions of generalised stress.  
Immediate triggers… 
The immediate trigger for the current turbulence 
was the discovery that CDOs held by a Bear 
Sterns hedge fund – mainly exposed to high risk 
US mortgage loans – turned out to be worthless, 
in contrast with earlier model-based evaluations 
showing significant value. Investors realised that 
the hitherto unquestioned quantitative models 
typically used for valuing CDOs failed to reflect 
actual market prices, in particular in times of 
market stress. Consequently, the shaken 
confidence in subprime based CDOs spread to 
other sophisticated financial products, even 
those without any subprime exposure.  
…and unpleasant surprises… 
The next surprise, at least for the broader public, 
came when it emerged that mainstream banks 
seemed to be much more exposed than was 
previously thought, often via bank-owned 
vehicles created for the very purpose of 
investing in CDOs. Even worse, the vehicles 
funded their respective investments via the 
money market, and the collapse of investor 
confidence led important segments of the 
money market to dry up as investors refused to 
buy asset-backed commercial paper and lower-
rated commercial paper, two important segments 
of the money market.   
Deprived of their usual funding sources, vehicles 
turned back to their mother banks for help, and 
tapped previously agreed credit lines. The 
resulting high liquidity demand from banks and 
the related collapse of trust among banks led to 
disturbances in the interbank market and forced 
central banks to inject massive amounts of 
liquidity.  
…are shaking investor confidence 
While the scale of losses arising from defaults in 
the US sub-prime market may be relatively small, 
the emergence of these losses in unexpected 
locations – such as in two second-tier German 
publicly owned banks – has triggered a 
reassessment of valuations in the CDO market 
as a whole. Many banks are known to be heavily 
involved in CDO markets through off-balance-
sheet vehicles and have been unable to offer 
concrete reassurance to investors about the 
extent of their exposure. So far it would seem 
that more sophisticated larger banks have 
relatively small risk exposures – when compared 
to capital – while a few smaller banks that may 
have lacked sufficient capacity to control risk 
exposures overextended themselves with risky 
products. Meanwhile, there is a lingering 
concern that further losses – amplified by the 
use of leverage – may soon emerge within the 
hedge-fund industry. In conditions of such 
uncertainty, it is rational for financial market 
participants not to engage in those activities that 
are deemed to involve significant counterparty 
risk, but this causes significant segments of the 
financial market not to function normally.   
2.2. Implications for financial institutions  
While past earnings growth provides a buffer 
for banks… 
Available data for the first half of 2007 indicates 
that euro-area bank profits have remained 
strong, supported by growth in trading income 
and also by a recovery in income from corporate 
lending after several years of weakness. Income 
from residential lending has remained high as 
well, but has come under some pressure amid 
intense competition for this business and a 
marked deceleration of growth rates of housing 
loan demand in several Member States. While 
costs have risen after several years of decline due 
to restructuring and other efficiency measures, 
cost-income ratios remain favourable overall, 
capitalisation high and solvency ratios sound.  
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…re-pricing of risk is likely to impact banks' 
performance and lending activity… 
When the proper functioning of financial 
markets will be fully restored, the operating 
environment of banks is likely to have changed 
significantly. Increased risk aversion among 
investors implies higher financing costs for 
banks via the money markets and possibly 
reduced income from trading and loan-
originating activities. To the extent that banks 
are exposed to durable valuation losses on their 
CDO exposures, there may also be a need for 
balance-sheet repair. While favourable capital 
and solvency ratios should limit the implications 
for the overall health of the banking sector, the 
deterioration in their operating environment can 
be expected to impact on lending behaviour, 
which might limit the hitherto widespread 
availability of credit. As credit risk is generally re-
assessed within the financial system, higher 
lending rates and a tightening in lending 
standards are to be expected.  
…and may also impact on insurance 
companies and pension funds 
The financial situation of insurance companies 
and pension funds has been generally improving 
in recent years, but these institutions are known 
to have been active buyers of structured 
products in recent years. Although the absolute 
level of exposure to sub-prime mortgages and 
non-investment grade CDOs is generally low, 
larger multinational insurers may have a 
somewhat higher level of exposure than medium 
and smaller-sized regional insurers. Insurers' 
exposure to declining valuations in structured 
products (such as CDOs) may be reduced due to 
their predominantly buy-and-hold and longer-
term investment strategies. However, they may 
be vulnerable to possible downgrades that would 
require forced sales at a time when valuations are 
low. On the other hand, a substantial share of 
those investments have been linked to products 
where the investment risk is borne by a 
policyholder (i.e. the final customer), therefore it 
would have a limited impact on solvency 
positions. Balance-sheet risks also arise from the 
decline in equity prices,6 although these risks 
                                                     
6  End of September, overall equity prices in the euro area 
had regained much of the losses incurred between mid-
might be offset by changes in prices for 
government securities. Nevertheless, a 
protracted decline in the market value of 
corporate bonds and higher-rated structured 
credit products along with reduced liquidity may 
reduce insurers' own access to debt and equity 
funding and have negative implications for their 
financial flexibility. The impact of a re-pricing of 
risk on the term structure of interest rates will 
also be relevant for discounting future liabilities.  
2.3. Implications for non-financial 
corporations 
Tightening credit conditions will affect euro-
area companies in a context of rising debt 
ratios 
In August 2007, bank lending to the non-
financial corporate sector in the euro area 
increased by a record 14.2% year-on-year, 
reflecting a corresponding expansion in 
investment activity but also high levels of M&A 
activity. The aggregate growth rate hides 
important differences between Member States, 
with lending up by almost 30% in Ireland, Spain 
and Slovenia and by only 3.2% in Germany.  
Graph 9: Financial balances and cash balances, non-
financial corporate sector, euro area (1) (2) 
(in % of GDP – 1999Q1 to 2007Q1 )  
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(1) Financial balances are measured by subtracting corporate 
investments from corporate savings (4 quarter moving average).  
(2) Cash balances are measured as the stock of outstanding 
currency & deposits. 
 Source: Commission services. 
                                                                             
July and mid-September. The rebound was however 
uneven, benefiting some sectors and some companies 
significantly more than others.  
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The generalised pick-up in bank lending to 
companies – after several years of subdued 
growth – has occurred despite evidence of 
strong internal cash balances within the 
corporate sector. As external financing has 
increased, the overall financial deficit (i.e. savings 
minus investments) of the euro-area corporate 
sector has widened to 2.5% of GDP in 2007 
from less than 1% of GDP in 2004 (Graph 9).  
Based on figures for the first quarter of 2007, 
the ratio of corporate debt to GDP in the euro 
area has exceeded 80% compared to around 
60% in 1999. The ratio of debt to income 
(annual pre-tax profits7) has risen to about 390% 
from 320% over the same period. The debt-to-
equity ratio has fallen over the period, in line 
with rising equity prices, although the recent 
correction may have partly reversed that trend 
(see Graph 10).  
Graph 10: Non-financial corporate debt ratios,  
euro area (in % – 1999Q1 to 2007Q1)  
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(1) As approximated by entrepreneurial income in the European 
quarterly sector accounts (4-quarter moving average). 
Source: Commission services. 
As a consequence of higher debt levels and 
rising interest rates, debt-servicing costs have 
begun to rise, though they remain below the 
peak levels recorded in 2001.  
While robust profitability in recent years will 
boost the resilience of companies as regards 
deteriorating external financing conditions, some 
reduction in their willingness and/or capacity to 
                                                     
7  As approximated by entrepreneurial income in the 
European quarterly sector accounts. 
borrow would be expected in the face of tighter 
credit conditions, in particular as regards the 
roll-over of short-term debt. In contrast, a 
further rise in debt-servicing costs relative to 
income would seem tolerable on the basis of 
historical experience. Tighter credit conditions 
could, however, have a more severe impact on 
the performance of the corporate sector, if 
consumer demand were to deteriorate sharply as 
well.  
2.4. Implications for households  
Although euro-area households have 
accumulated record levels of debt… 
In the euro area, the ratio of household debt to 
(gross) disposable income has risen to 90% from 
roughly 70% in 1999, while the ratio to GDP 
has risen to 59% from about 45% over the same 
period (Graph 11).  
Graph 11: Household sector debt ratios, euro area 
(in % – 1999Q1 to 2007Q1) (1) 
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(1) Gross disposable income is based on a 2 quarter moving 
average. 
Source: Commission services. 
Household interest payments to banks 
represented about 4.3% of disposable income in 
the first quarter of 2007, which is the highest 
level since the start of the harmonised ECB 
interest rate statistics in 2003. However, a longer 
time series (based on Eurostat sectoral accounts) 
indicates that the current debt-servicing burden 
remains below levels recorded in the first quarter 
of 2000 (see Graph 12).  
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Graph 12: Household interest payments, euro area 
(in % of GDI – 1999Q1 to 2007Q1) (1) 
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(1) GDI series is based on a 2-quarter moving average.  
(2) National account data. Despite broader sectoral coverage this 
estimate of interest payments is lower than the one restricted to 
banks because it excludes banks' margins. 
(3) ECB data. 
Source: Commission services, ECB. 
… the impact of tighter credit conditions is 
difficult to predict 
In principle, the household sector – as a net 
saver – might expect to benefit from higher 
interest rates associated with a reassessment of 
credit risk. However, the effect on household 
income could be more negative than expected if 
tighter credit conditions are reflected mainly in a 
widening of spreads between lending and 
deposit rates, so that the increase in debt-
servicing costs of household borrowers 
significantly exceeds any increase in interest 
income. Moreover, any positive income effect 
on household demand could be outweighed by 
reduced access to credit because of tighter 
lending standards, negative wealth effects linked 
to declining asset values and a more generalised 
decline in consumer confidence. In this respect, 
the evolution of housing markets will be of key 
importance.   
In the euro area, evidence suggests that the 
housing market had already begun to weaken in 
the first half of 2007, with a decline in building 
permits and a deceleration in mortgage lending. 
The growth rate in mortgage lending decelerated 
to 8.1% year-on-year in July and August, from 
more than 12% in June 2006 (see Graph 13). 
Growth rates in mortgage lending have 
decelerated particularly sharply in Slovenia and 
Ireland, but also in Belgium, Greece, Spain, Italy 
and the Netherlands. In contrast to the United 
States, the euro area has only a limited market 
for sub-prime mortgages and the risk of 
mortgage default is much lower. However, the 
prevalence of variable-rate mortgages in some 
Member States with high household debt levels 
is a source of vulnerability as interest rates 
increase. Other concerns include the extent to 
which housing markets may already be 
substantially overvalued in some Member States 
and the implications of past general weakening 
in lending standards.  
Graph 13: Loans for house purchase, euro area 
(y-o-y change in % - Jan. 2000 to Aug. 2007)  
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2.5. Conclusion  
Coming after a protracted period of 
exceptionally benign financial conditions, recent 
financial turbulence has shaken investor 
confidence and will probably cause a tightening 
of credit conditions.  
Looking into the effects of tighter credit 
conditions on balance sheets, it seems that all 
the main economic sectors will probably be 
affected. Past earnings growth should provide an 
adequate buffer for banks but the re-pricing of 
risk is likely to impact both their performance 
and their lending activity. Tighter credit 
conditions are also likely to affect euro-area non-
financial companies which have experienced 
rising debt ratios in recent years and had seen an 
increase in debt-servicing costs already before 
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Box 1: Impact of tighter financing conditions on GDP growth 
 
The impact of recent market turbulence will crucially depend on the time it takes financial markets to revert to an
orderly functioning and on the extent to which the re-pricing of risk and tightening of credit conditions persist after
the turbulence. 
 
DG ECFIN has carried out a simulation with its global macroeconomic model QUEST to illustrate a possible
impact of an increase in the risk premium. It assumes an increase in the risk premium of 0.5 pp in both the US and
the euro area, and of 0.2 pp. in the rest of the world, which appears somewhat less exposed to losses stemming from
the US sub-prime mortgage market. Via a dampening effect on private consumption and investment, real GDP
growth is reduced by some 0.3 pp. compared to the baseline forecast in the first year (i.e. in 2008). In the following
year (i.e. 2009), the impact of the endogenously assumed monetary policy response starts to counteract the impact of
the higher risk premium and the GDP level is only some ¼ pp. lower than in the baseline (implying that GDP
growth would be marginally higher than it would otherwise have been). In 2010, the GDP level would still be lower
than it would have been without the shock, but the impact would be roughly halved. 
 
 
the onset of the financial turbulence. Robust 
profitability should, however, help mitigate the 
negative impact of tighter credit conditions in 
the non-financial corporate sector. Despite the 
record levels of debt accumulated in recent 
years, the impact on households is difficult to 
predict as the sector is a net saver. However, 
households' wealth and savings also depend on 
house prices and housing markets are likely to be 
negatively affected by the change in the financial 
environment. 
At this juncture, the overall effect of the 
financial turbulence on economic growth in the 
euro area is difficult to predict since the 
functioning of money markets has not returned 
to normal and the exposure of euro-area banks 
to CDO markets is not yet fully known. To 
illustrate the possible order of magnitudes 
involved, Box 1 presents the results of a 
simulation carried out with Commission's 
QUEST model according to which a 
0.5 percentage point increase in risk premia 
would lower euro-area GDP by 0.3 percentage 
point in 2008 compared to a central scenario, the 
shock thereafter being counteracted in 2009 by a 
monetary policy response (taken as endogenous 
in the model). 
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Focus 
II. Cross-border risk sharing: has it increased in the euro area? 
The growing integration of financial markets deepens the linkages between the economies of the euro area and has the 
potential, through better cross-border risk sharing, to raise the efficiency of the functioning of EMU and help economies to 
better adjust to macroeconomic shocks. Cross-border risk sharing has strong foundations at the micro level, since 
diversification delivers higher returns and lower risk for financial portfolios. From a macroeconomic point of view, provided 
that capital income is received in a diversified manner from countries with low output correlation, the ensuing smoother income 
is likely to make the economy more resilient to domestic shocks through less volatile consumption. The analysis of a wide range 
of data, including banking and balance-of-payments data, bears testimony to a rapid expansion of cross-border financial flows 
within the euro area. Estimations of risk sharing using aggregate national accounts data however point to mixed results. 
Risk-sharing through capital markets has increased in the euro area but remains small compared with the US and the size of 
estimates appears to be sensitive to the inclusion of smaller Member States with large financial sectors. One possible 
explanation for the still-low level of risk-sharing in the euro area involves asset composition. Whereas financial integration in 
bonds and other debt securities has made dramatic progress within the euro area in the space of a few years, it has not done so 
to the same extent for equities. Since the equity home bias seems still fairly entrenched in some euro-area countries, further 
financial market reforms would not only ensure a better performance of the European financial system, but would also 
reinforce the stabilising role of risk-sharing for the euro area.  
Since the beginning of the 1980s, international 
financial markets have become increasingly 
integrated. While global trade openness (as 
measured by the sum of exports and imports 
divided by GDP) has doubled over the last 
20 years and now stands at 60% of the world's 
GDP, the share of gross international asset 
holdings in world GDP has seen an eightfold 
increase over the last 25 years to more than 
130%.8 In the same manner that trade creates 
interdependencies across borders, financial flows 
have the potential to enhance risk sharing and 
deepen ties between economic agents in 
neighbouring countries.  
This focus analyses various aspects linked to risk-
sharing within the euro area. Section 1 looks at 
the relevance of risk sharing for economic 
stabilisation. Section 2 shows that growing 
financial linkages within the euro area provide a 
favorable environment for risk sharing. In 
Section 3, we estimate aggregate figures, which 
indicate growing, but still limited, risk sharing 
patterns in the euro area. Section 4 proposes a 
tentative explanation for these mixed results 
involving asset composition. 
                                                     
8  'The international financial architecture – Where do we 
stand?', Speech by J.-C. Trichet, Council on Foreign 
Relations, New York, 16 April 2007. 
1.  The relevance of risk sharing for 
economic stabilisation purposes 
The financial sector fulfils key functions that are 
necessary for an efficient allocation of financial 
resources in time and space and allows real-
sector activity to expand optimally. It is generally 
admitted that financial market reforms not only 
boost the performance of the financial sector, 
but also have a broader impact on the economy's 
potential output by allowing a better allocation of 
capital. In addition, financial integration also has 
the potential to increase cross-border risk sharing 
between euro-area Member States. 
Risk sharing means that an entity acquires a claim 
on the future revenue streams of other entities 
which are not correlated with its own primary 
source of income, allowing it to smooth out 
fluctuations in the amount of goods and services 
it consumes over time. It can occur at several 
levels: directly between economic agents or 
mediated through the banking and insurance 
sectors (hence the role of savings and borrowing 
to smooth out consumption) or between 
economies in a regime of free capital 
movements. 
From a micro perspective, the benefits of 
diversification have long been established in 
finance theory. Investors might want to increase 
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the performance of their savings beyond the risk-
free rate, but higher performance generates also 
higher risk, deterring risk-averse investors from 
holding portfolios with high returns. However, 
by holding instruments which are not perfectly 
correlated, diversification allows investors to 
reduce portfolio risk while increasing overall 
returns. By increasing returns and lowering risk, 
the performance of a diversified portfolio moves 
toward the efficient frontier, defined in the 
standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as 
all the possible combinations of the portfolios 
with minimum risk and portfolios with maximum 
returns. 
At the macro level, the benefits of risk sharing 
could be substantial. Within a given set of 
economies, country-specific shocks have the 
potential to significantly impact growth, unless 
the income from alternative foreign sources kicks 
in and smoothes private consumption. Access to 
international financial markets is weakening the 
link between domestic savings and domestic 
investments, whereas in a closed economy the 
only avenue available to households for 
smoothing consumption would come from other 
domestic sectors. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and 
Yosha (2004)9 note that the more specific a 
country is (i.e. the more remote geographically or 
the more specialised it is), the more it could 
benefit from risk sharing. It would provide risk 
sharing opportunities for other countries, while 
being able to hedge against its domestic 
developments by investing in other countries. 
Although risk patterns are likely to be observed 
for the EU as a whole, the introduction of the 
euro facilitates risk sharing between euro-area 
Member States by lowering four barriers to 
cross-border financial flows: 
• Cross-border transaction costs are bound to 
decrease through stronger competition and 
policies aimed at streamlining financial 
infrastructures in the euro area, for instance 
clearing and settlement. 
• Financial markets, spurred in the euro area by 
scale economies and competition, could lead 
                                                     
9  Kalemli-Ozcan S., B. Sorensen and O. Yosha (2004), 
'Asymmetric shocks and risk sharing in a monetary union: 
Updated evidence and policy implications for Europe' 
CEPR discussion Paper No. 4463. 
to deeper and more liquid markets, allowing 
market participants to hedge against a wider 
spectrum of risks. 
• Risk is likely to be lower in the euro area as 
overall risks attached to cross-border 
investments would decrease through the 
elimination of exchange rate risks, leaving 
only issuer and country risk;  
• The performance of the financial system and 
its capability to properly discharge its 
intermediation function should improve over 
time through stronger competition, and hence 
its ability to identify risk properly and price it 
accordingly.10 
From a euro-area perspective, not only should 
the single currency facilitate risk sharing, but risk-
sharing could also become more critical in an 
economic policy perspective. Without the help of 
traditional instruments of economic policy such 
as the exchange and interest rate, attention has 
been drawn to the capability of risk sharing to 
provide a market-based adjustment force for 
intra-euro-area adjustment via financial markets. 
Theoretically speaking, a two-way process could 
be envisaged between membership of the euro 
area and risk sharing: being in the euro area 
fosters risk sharing, which in turn enhances the 
cohesion of the euro area. 
Governments could also contribute to the risk 
sharing process, since cross-border state transfers 
could counteract specific national developments 
through various instruments (emergency relief 
after natural disasters, means-dependant social 
transfers and infrastructure investments or EU 
subsidies to poorer regions). However, the 
impact of such transfers is bound to be relatively 
small in the euro area relative to the US, because 
of the small size of EU budget in comparison 
with the US federal budget.  
                                                     
10  Impacted by the decrease in bond returns caused by 
interest-rate convergence in the run-up to EMU, Italian 
retail investors were lured into investing in high-yield 
securities from Latin America, and especially from 
Argentina. In 2001, Latin America was prominent in the 
Italian bond portfolio, with a 17.4% share. The 
subsequent Argentinean default led to large losses for an 
estimated 450 000 households. 
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However, it might also be argued that 
international capital flows are not needed to 
share risk. A strand of corporate finance theory 
has stressed the importance for companies to use 
option-based techniques to structure their capital 
investment decisions. For instance, risk-adjusted 
parameters would be used in the decision to set 
up facilities abroad. Through these techniques, 
the flow of income originating from a global 
company would act as a natural hedge against 
country-specific developments. The globalisation 
of companies would lead to more intense cross-
border foreign direct investment flows, while 
domestic investors would benefit from some 
form of risk sharing, even if investing solely in 
large 'national' companies. Therefore, for risk 
sharing purposes, it could be argued that trade 
and cross-border FDI has the potential to be a 
substitute for cross-border portfolio 
investment.11 
2.  Statistical evidence points to ever-
growing financial linkages within the 
euro area 
Cross-border bank claims have expanded 
swiftly 
In the past decade, euro-area banks have rapidly 
expanded their operations abroad, adding ever-
larger amounts of cross-border claims to their 
balance sheets. According to BIS data, these 
claims have strongly increased within the euro 
area. Intra-euro-area cross-border banking claims 
have risen from the equivalent of 23.8% of the 
euro-area GDP in March 2000 to 48.3% in 
March 2007. As a share of total cross-border 
claims by euro-area banks, these claims edged up 
marginally during the same period from 37.2% to 
38.3%. The increase in the euro-area share is 
remarkable insofar as it has taken place against 
the background of globalisation and the 
increasing attractiveness of emerging markets and 
other developed economies. 
                                                     
11  It might then be sound for a global company to spread 
production facilities in order to provide a 'built-in' hedge 
against risk, in whatever form it may take, beyond 
productivity considerations. Hence for instance the 
rationale for Japanese carmakers to set up facilities in the 
United States. 
Graph 14: Cross-border consolidated claims of the euro-
area banks towards various regions  
(in USD bn – June 1999 to March 2007) 
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Source: Bank for International Settlements. 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain have been 
among the main beneficiaries of this financial 
deepening process seen within the euro area 
since 1999 (see Graph 15). The case of Portugal 
illustrates the pattern. Spiegel (2004) shows that 
euro-area-related integration has tripled bilateral 
lending from other euro-area countries to 
Portugal, other parameters being controlled for.12 
As a result, the lending share of non-EU banks 
has shrunk dramatically, while the share of EU 
non-euro-area banks has remained broadly 
unchanged. The author finds two reasons for this 
shift. First, being in the euro area diminishes the 
overall level of risk through the elimination of 
currency risk. Second, enhanced trade 
connections mean that the reliability and viability 
of potential borrowers can be better assessed by 
businesses and banks. There would then be 
spillovers from trade into financial variables. 
Another explanation based on trade integration 
has been proposed by Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2002).13 Trade integration makes the demand for 
the country's goods more elastic, and hence 
lowers future potential terms of trade 
adjustment. Creditors then become more 
                                                     
12  Spiegel, M., (2004), 'Monetary and financial integration: 
evidence from Portuguese borrowing patterns', FRBSF 
Working Paper No. 2004-07. 
13  Blanchard, O. and F. Giavazzi (2002) 'Current account 
deficits in the euro area: the end of the Feldstein-Horioka 
puzzle?', MIT Working Paper No. 03-05, (September 17). 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area III/2007 
 
 
 
- 22 - 
confident in the ability of an affected economy to 
eventually repay its debts.14  
Graph 15: Cross-border consolidated claims of the euro-
area banks (counterparties from selected euro-area 
countries)  
(Base 100= June 1999 – June 1999 to March 2007) 
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Source: Bank for International Settlements. 
BIS data also point to the increasing share of off-
balance-sheet items. Off-balance-sheet claims 
represent potential claims in the form of credit 
commitments, guarantees extended and 
derivative contracts. This additional exposure 
represented the equivalent of 54.1% of the total 
cross-border claims of BIS banks against euro-
area counterparts in September 2006, against 
35% in June 2005. This expansion reflects the 
boom of new financial products such as credit 
derivatives. Since these new products reallocate 
and spread considerable amounts of credit risks, 
international financial linkages may be deeper 
than they seem. For instance, in the case of 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), individual 
claims are first pooled through securitisation, 
then structured into rated tranches, enabling 
these risks to be transferred to market 
participants worldwide with different horizons, 
asset/liability securities and risk appetite. 15 
                                                     
14  However, this positive impact of EMU on adjustment 
patterns might have been somewhat overstated at the 
time. See Blanchard (2006) for a reappraisal, looking at 
the case of Portugal.  Blanchard, O. ,'Adjustment with the 
euro. The difficult case of Portugal'. MIT Working Paper 
No. 06-04. 
15  Much depends however on the ability of the institutions 
which structure and rate those products to assess and 
price risk adequately. Otherwise, risk might be merely 
transferred from the banking sector to other, potentially 
less experienced, investors. 
Portfolio investment witnessed a jump in the 
run-up to EMU 
Data on portfolio investments have been 
markedly improved through the conduct, under 
the patronage of the IMF, of the Comprehensive 
Portfolio Investment survey (CPIS) since 1997.16 
The share of intra-euro-area portfolio 
investments within the euro area has risen 
significantly in a short period of time.  
Graph 16: Intra-euro-area share of total cross-border 
portfolio investments 
(in % – 1997, 2001 and 2005) 
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Source: IMF CPIS. Germany, Greece and Luxembourg did not 
report in 1997. 
Between 1997 and 2005, the share of the euro 
area in the world portfolio of euro-area countries 
increased markedly (in particular for Italy, 
+36.5 percentage points, Finland, +28.2 pp, and 
Portugal, +22.2 pp). The bulk of the shift 
materialised between 1997 and 2001 (Graph 16). 
In 1997, only one country (Belgium) held a 
majority of its portfolio assets within the euro 
area. In 2005, eight euro-area Member States did 
so (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain). 
Holdings of debt securities increased significantly 
and formed the bulk of the increase within the 
euro area. Available statistics show that the 
proportion of euro-area debt securities held in 
other euro-area countries almost trebled in less 
than ten years. It represented between 30 and 
40% of outstanding debt in 2006, compared to a 
range of 12 to 16% less than ten years ago. This 
                                                     
16  Other capital flows recorded in the capital account 
include mainly foreign direct investment flows and other 
investment flows (trade credits and loans and deposits). 
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expansion has been particularly marked for 
securities issued by non-banks, notably 
government bonds. Holdings of euro-area debt 
securities held in other EU non-euro-area 
countries provide a "control group" to determine 
whether euro-area specific effects are at work. It 
appears that the expansion of cross-border 
holdings in non-euro-area EU countries has been 
less dynamic, which confirms that the euro has 
indeed had a specific impact. 
Graph 17: Euro-area debt securities held by 
counterparts in other euro-area countries / in other 
non-euro-area EU countries  
(in% – as a proportion of the outstanding debt)  
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Source: European Central Bank. Excluding holdings of central 
banks. MFI: Monetary Financial Institutions. 
 
Cross-border inter-bank loans within the euro 
area have also increased in recent years. 
However, inter-bank loans between the euro area 
and the rest of the EU are expanding as fast, 
arguably due to the role of London as a major 
financial hub for euro-area banks. Cross-border 
loans to non-financial agents from other euro-
area countries remained very limited (less than 
4% of the loans outstanding in 2006), which 
illustrates the difficulty of conducting retail 
lending operations remotely, due to residual 
hindrances of an either legal or practical nature.17 
                                                     
17 However, such hindrances could be bypassed through 
direct investment in financial institutions from other 
euro-area countries through mergers and acquisitions. 
The rapid increase in such operations in recent years 
shows that the cross-border consolidation of the sector 
has been set in motion and euro-area financial institutions 
are gaining a foothold in neighbouring foreign markets. 
Aggregate financial amounts paid and 
received from foreign countries remain 
moderate for larger euro-area countries 
Economic agents’ capacity to share risk 
internationally can be approximated by looking at 
the difference between Gross National Income 
(GNI) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over 
time, since GNI includes factor income received 
and paid to abroad (see Box 2 for a 
methodological discussion). 
Graph 18: Net factor income for euro-area countries 
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Source: Commission services. 
In most countries, net receipts of property 
income account for most of the difference 
between GDP and GNI. The size of income 
flows can vary widely from one euro-area 
country to another, depending on the size of the 
economy, its specialisation in financial services 
and the respective returns on assets and liabilities 
abroad. Other factors may impact the size and 
contribution of external sources of income to 
GNI, such as the existence of tax shelters and 
price-transfer strategies of companies. Income 
received from abroad represents the equivalent 
of less than 5% of GDP in Germany, but 22% in 
Ireland and 221% in Luxembourg. In general, the 
difference between GDP and GNI for most 
euro-area countries remains relatively small, 
except for Ireland and Luxembourg, for which 
the difference is equal to respectively 13.9% and 
16.8% of GDP. Since most cross-border income 
flows take place within the euro area, they cancel 
each other out in consolidated euro-area GNI 
figures. GNI was only higher than GDP for the 
euro area by the equivalent of 0.2% of GDP in 
2006.  
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3.  Estimating the scale of risk sharing in 
the euro-area 
Asbrubali, Sorensen and Yosha published a 
seminal paper on quantification of risk sharing in 
1996.18 Their methodology aims to identify three 
different channels for risk sharing within an 
economy.  
• First, risk could be shared via cross-
ownership of productive assets (capital 
market channel). The existence of a deep and 
efficient capital market would be a 
prerequisite for the channel to function 
properly. 
                                                     
18  Asdrubali F., B. Sorensen and O. Yosha (1996), 'Channels 
of interstate risk sharing: United States 1963-1990', The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November. 
• Second, the tax-transfer system of a 
federation's central government is a 
potentially significant vehicle for income 
smoothing (fiscal channel). This has to do 
with the traditional stabilisation role of public 
finance identified by Musgrave in his classical 
distinction of the roles of public finance. This 
channel matters most when federal taxes and 
spending are significant, as they are in the 
United States. 
• Third, economic agents within a union or a 
federation may smooth their consumption 
through borrowing and lending on national 
(or foreign) credit markets, thus unlocking 
liquidity constraints (credit market channel). 
A well-functioning financial system would 
help intermediate between lenders and 
borrowers. 
Box 2: Gross domestic product (GDP) and Gross National Income (GNI) 
 
 To correct GDP into GNI (formerly known as GNP in ESA 1978), it is necessary to add primary income 
(compensation of employees, taxes less subsidies and property income) received by residents from abroad and 
deduct primary income created by production in the country but transferred to entities residing abroad. Wages and 
salaries from abroad are those that are earned by residents, that is, by persons who essentially live and consume 
inside the economic territory but work abroad, or persons who live and work abroad for only short periods (seasonal 
workers) and whose centre of economic interest thus remains in their home country. Property income from abroad 
includes interest, dividends and all or part of the retained earnings of foreign enterprises owned fully or in part by 
residents. Income flows with the rest of world might suffer from data limitations. Most countries use surveys on 
direct investment and apply estimated returns to determine income from investment abroad. In addition, and for 
consistency with balance-of-payments data, income from direct investment includes estimated retained earnings of 
foreign enterprises owned fully or in part by residents. Retained earnings may not actually return to the residents or 
may do so only after a lag; their inclusion in property income and eventually GNI could be questioned since they do 
not directly impact the residents' disposable income. Finally, data on households' assets abroad (and the income 
thereof) might have to be computed indirectly, especially for holdings of securities issued abroad. 
 
Primary income paid to the rest of the world, 
euro area 
Primary income received from the rest of the world, 
euro area 
Interest
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Dividends
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Source: Commission services Source: Commission services 
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Box 3: Quantifying the extent of risk sharing in the euro area 
 
 This box presents the results of an econometric exercise aimed at estimating the extent of risk-sharing among euro-
area Member States (excluding Slovenia due to data limitations). As a matter of comparison, it also provides 
estimates of risk-sharing among EU15 Member States and a group of OECD countries (EU15 plus the US, Japan, 
Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Australia and New Zealand). 
 
The methodology used hereafter was first developed and applied to the US by Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha in 
1996. In their paper, Asdrubali at al. identified three channels of risk-sharing, namely smoothing through capital 
markets (βK), international transfers (βF) and credit markets (βC). The first channel measures the share of income 
fluctuations that is smoothed through portfolio diversification with international assets and is reflected in the 
difference between GDP and GNI. The second channel covers the share of income fluctuations that is smoothed 
through international transfers or fiscal transfers at a fiscal federation level (in the case of the US). The last channel 
is a more complex one and includes two main elements: the income smoothing achieved through national 
government transfers and the consumption smoothing achieved through changes in households net asset positions 
(borrowing, lending or sales of assets). The risk-sharing decomposition also includes a residual (βU) that measures 
the share of risk that cannot be insured against.  
 
At the euro-area level the main smoothing channel is expected to be the capital market, as the second one will be 
lower due to the lack of fiscal federation. The third channel is likely to be significant but difficult to interpret due to 
its heterogeneity.  
 
The following regressions are estimated in a panel data. The tKv , , tFv , , tCv ,  and tUv ,  variables capture time-fixed 
effects in each equation. 
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The analysis is carried out for the periods 1970-2006 and 1999-2006. The indicators used are the GDP, GNI, 
disposable gross national income (DGNI) and private consumption (PC) in per capita terms and in national 
currency. As in Sorensen and Yosha (1998), all the series are transformed into constant prices with the private 
consumption deflator as the objective is to assess the risk-sharing in terms of real consumption. The results of this 
analysis are presented in the tables below for the period 1999-2006. 
 
Estimated risk-sharing in the euro area, EU15 and OECD for the period 1999-2006 
 Euro area Euro area 9 (excluding Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Portugal) 
EU15 OECD US 
Kβ  21.2% (3.72) 
R2- 0.21 
5.4% 
(3.99) 
R2- 0.8 
18.1% 
(3.42) 
R2- 0.15 
8.7% 
(2.58) 
R2-0.07 
55%* 
(14) 
39%** 
(13) 
Fβ  6.3% (2.6) 
R2-0.12 
3.9% 
(4.4) 
R2-0.32 
4.3% 
(1.66) 
R2-0.02 
1.7% 
(1.02) 
R2-0.02 
13%** 
(13) 
CGβ  14.6% (1.52) 
R2-0.49 
Cβ  15.3% (2.20) 
R2- 0.22 
CCβ  -11.4% (-1.20) 
R2-0.25 
13.3% 
(2.01) 
R2 -0.14 
43% 
(7.56) 
R2 -0.30 
23%** 
(4) 
Uβ  57.1% (10.57) 
R2-0.66 
86.5% 
(10.86) 
R2-0.68 
62.7% 
(11.46) 
R2- 0.60 
42.9% 
(4.74) 
R2-0.47 
25%** 
(4) 
* Estimates shown in Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha O (2004) for the 1991-1998 period. 
** Estimates shown in Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996) for the 1964-1990 period. 
 
The table shows a comparison between the risk-sharing through the three channels in the euro area, EU15, OECD 
and US. The capital market smoothing in the euro area is similar to the one in EU15 and higher than in the OECD 
but much lower than available estimates for the US. However, the result for the euro area changes  
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substantially when Ireland and Luxembourg are excluded from the sample. The risk-sharing through this channel 
for the remaining 10 countries is only 7.6%. 
 
The second channel is smaller due to the fact that the euro area is not a fiscal federation and this smoothing is 
achieved mostly through the structural and economic cohesion policy. Due to this aspect, when Spain, Ireland, 
Greece and Portugal are eliminated from the sample the coefficient becomes statistically insignificant.  
 
The third channel is much higher in the OECD than in the euro area. In order to better understand the low level of 
risk-sharing through this channel in the euro area, the βC was decomposed in βCG (smoothing through national 
government transfers and taxes) and βCC (smoothing through private credit market). The results are presented in 
the second column for only 9 countries due to lack of data for real gross disposable income of households and 
NPISH for other Member States. According to these results, government taxes and transfers are indeed providing 
some cushion against income fluctuations but their impact is relatively small. The estimate for the private credit 
market channel is negative, a result which is in line with the observation that developments in the saving ratio have 
been pro- rather than counter-cyclical in the latest downturn, aggravating the slump in disposable income rather 
than offsetting it. 
 
Overall, the extent of risk-sharing against income fluctuations (whatever its form) appears to be much lower in the 
euro area than in the US as indicated by a much higher βU coefficient. 
 
The table below presents the results from the same set of equations but computed for the entire 1970-2006 period 
and using a dummy for the existence of the euro. The right column for each of the region presents the final results 
(the sum of the two coefficients, while the t statistic is the one for the dummy coefficient). According to these 
results, the size of the capital market channel increased (and became meaningful) after 1999. This was also the case 
for the OECD as a whole but to a much more limited degree. In contrast, the credit channel seems to have lost 
importance after 1999 in the euro area but not in the OECD as a whole. It is worth stressing that tests with 
dummies for alternative years show some increase in the size of the capital market channel already in the first half of 
the 1990s but the βK coefficient reaches its maximum with the 1999 dummy. This suggests that, in addition to 
global financial integration, the rising importance of the capital market channel in the euro area is related both to 
European financial integration and the euro. 
 
Estimated risk-sharing in euro area and OECD for the period 1970-2006 
(using a dummy for the period 1999-2006) 
 Euro area OECD 
 Before 1999 After 1999 Before 1999 After 1999 
Kβ  2.1% (2.02) 
R2- 0.14 
21.2% 
(3.32) 
 
1.8% 
(2.18) 
R2- 0.07 
8.7% 
(1.98) 
 
Fβ  -1.4% (-1.59) 
R2-0.125 
6.3% 
(2.88) 
-0.7% 
(-1..24) 
R2-0.03 
1.77% 
(1.35) 
 
Cβ  51.9% (16.75) 
R2- 0.55 
15.3% 
(-4.85) 
46% 
(18.9) 
R2- 0.45 
43% 
(-0.45) 
Uβ  45.6% (15.75) 
R2-0.65 
57.2% 
(1.87) 
 
52.7% 
(23) 
R2-0.58 
42.9% 
(-2.45) 
 
The dummy takes value 1 for the period 1999-2006 and 0 in rest. 
The column "After 1999" presents the total coefficient, whereas the t statistic in the brackets is the value for the dummy 
coefficient only. 
 
In conclusion, although the levels of risk-sharing in the euro area are much lower than those found by Asdrubali, 
Sorensen and Yosha in 1996 for the US, there has been a clear increase in risk-sharing through the capital market 
channel in the 1990s which is probably partly related to the euro and European financial integration. There is, 
however, clearly scope for further risk-sharing within the euro area, particularly regarding the credit channel.  
 
Refrences: 
Asdrubali  P., B. Sorensen and O. Yosha (1996), 'Channels of interstate risk sharing: United States 1963-1990', The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, (November). 
Sorensen B. and O. Yosha (1998), 'International risk sharing and European monetary unification', Journal of 
International Economics , vol. 45, pp. 211-238. 
Kalemli-Ozcan S., B. Sorensen and O. Yosha (2004), 'Asymmetric shocks and risk sharing in a monetary union: 
updated evidence and policy implications for Europe', CEPR discussion Paper No. 4463.  
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Both the credit and the capital market channels 
would benefit from deeper financial integration 
although they work differently: risk sharing 
through capital markets should be conducted 
through the setting-up of an asset position before 
shocks occur, while risk sharing through credit 
markets can be carried out after a given shock. 
To quantify risk sharing, the authors developed a 
methodology based on the decomposition of the 
cross-sectional variance in Gross State Product 
for the fifty US States. Risk sharing would dictate 
that shocks to output should be followed by 
smaller shocks to income, then again by smaller 
shocks to disposable income and eventually by 
smaller shocks to consumption. 
Over the period 1964-1990, the federal 
government smoothed 13% of shocks, whereas 
39% were smoothed by capital markets and 23% 
by credit markets. 25% of shocks remained 
unsmoothed. The estimates calculated by 
Asdrubali at al. also highlighted the large and 
growing role of capital markets in smoothing 
economic fluctuations in comparison with other 
well-known channels such as the federal 
government or domestic credit. 19 
This methodology is used to estimate risk sharing 
for the euro area, the EU and the OECD in 
recent years (see Box 3 for further 
methodological details). For the period 1999-
2006, the share of shocks smoothed though 
cross-border financial flows is higher in the euro 
area than in the OECD (21.2% versus 8.7%). It 
also rose very significantly in the 1990s, pointing 
to the substantial positive impact of European 
financial integration and EMU. However, the 
coefficient is highly dependant on the inclusion 
of a few smaller, outward-oriented countries. 
Without Luxembourg and Ireland, the share of 
shocks thus smoothed is only 7.6%. 
Not surprisingly, smoothing through 
international fiscal transfers is low in the euro 
area (6.3%). A more puzzling development is 
that smoothing through developments in credit 
markets have been much lower in the period 
1999-2006 than in the period before 1999, as the 
evolution of the savings ratio has recently been 
pro-cyclical, amplifying rather than cushioning 
                                                     
19  Capital markets smoothed 48% of shocks in the last 
period measured, 1981-1990. 
swings in disposable income. All in all, overall 
risk sharing in the euro area remains well below 
the equivalent US figures, which explains why the 
unsmoothed share of shocks to output is much 
higher in the euro area (45.6% versus 25%).20 
While suggesting that risk sharing through capital 
market and cross-border portfolio flows has 
increased in euro-area Member States, the 
estimations presented in Box 3 should be 
interpreted with caution because of the large 
influence of a few outward-oriented economies 
within the euro area. The assessment should 
recognise the still-limited time span available for 
the estimations. 
4.  The still-incomplete risk sharing 
patterns might relate to asset 
composition 
Debt instruments to be followed by equity as 
main vehicle for risk sharing 
As noted in Section 2, debt securities played a 
decisive role in the first wave of cross-border 
financial flows in the run-up to EMU and the 
first years of the euro. Investors took advantage 
of residual bond spreads in expected members of 
the euro area to expand their cross-border 
investments ('convergence play'), while the level 
of country risk was perceived to have largely 
disappeared. Through this significant expansion 
of cross-border debt, the potential for income 
enhancement through bonds has now been 
almost entirely exhausted since countries’ spreads 
have been compressed since 1999 and price 
correlation in euro-area government bonds is 
now close to unity. 
As a result of this convergence, investors may be 
less tempted to hedge against risk through 
investments in other euro-area Member States. 
However this apparent paradox will not 
necessarily push risk sharing back to its previous 
levels. As the overall level of risk diminishes 
within the euro area, investors are likely to shift 
their strategic portfolio allocation and invest in 
riskier products, such as venture capital and 
equities instead of bonds. Preferences regarding 
issuers might also shift, with more appetite for 
riskier corporate securities at the expense of 
                                                     
20  US figures covers the 1964-1990 period. 
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government bonds, with a positive impact on the 
effective level of risk sharing. Whereas a buy-
and-hold bondholder usually gets a fixed cash 
flow and would be affected by downward risk on 
the principal of his investment (through a "credit 
event"), equity investment allows full risk 
sharing, both on the upside and on the downside.  
Cross-border equity flows still have 
considerable room for development 
De Santis and Gérard (2006) measure the extent 
to which the observed share of foreign assets 
diverges from the theoretical share of foreign 
assets in an "optimal" borderless portfolio.21 This 
allows them to estimate the extent of the so-
called home bias in portfolio allocation. Results 
show that whereas the home bias has been 
almost halved for bonds from 1997 to 2001 in 
the euro area, the decline in the equity home bias 
has been less marked (see Graphs 19 and 20). 22 
Graph 19: Fixed income home bias, euro-area Member 
States (Share in % – 1997-2001) (1) 
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(1) The fixed income home bias measure is computed as one minus 
the actual share of foreign fixed income assets in the total country 
fixed income portfolio divided by the optimal share of foreign fixed 
income assets in total fixed income economy holdings. The optimal 
fixed income share invested abroad is estimated as one minus the 
country market weight in the world fixed income index. 
Source: De Santis and Gérard (2006). 
 
                                                     
21  De Santis, R. and B. Gérard. (2006), 'Financial integration, 
international portfolio choice and the European Monetary 
Union', ECB Working Paper No 626, (May). 
22  However small it was, the decrease in the euro-area equity 
home bias may be related to the euro, since the UK and 
US respective biases barely changed during the period. 
Graph 20: Equity home bias, euro-area Member States 
(Share in % – 1997-2001) (1) 
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(1) The equity home bias measure is computed as one minus the 
actual share of foreign equity assets in the total country equity 
portfolio divided by the optimal share of foreign equity assets in 
total economy equity holdings. The optimal equity share invested 
abroad is estimated as one minus the country market weight in the 
world equity index. 
Source: De Santis and Gérard (2006). 
Another interesting feature is that the decrease in 
the fixed-income home bias has been somewhat 
stronger in countries where it was originally 
highest (such as in Italy). In contrast, the equity 
home bias has decreased more in countries 
where it was already low (see Graph 21). As a 
result, equity home bias differences within the 
euro area have widened in this period. 
Portes and Rey (2005) show that cross-border 
equity flows are negatively related to distance, 
just like physical trade in goods.23 To explain this 
puzzle, the authors find evidence that distance is 
a proxy for information: additional variables 
representing more directly proxies for 
information, such as telephone call traffic, the 
number of branches in a given countries, and an 
index of insider trading, work as a substitute for 
distance. Cross-border equity flows within 
Europe obey the same principle, even when the 
equations control for large intra-European trade 
flows. Therefore the authors conclude that the 
theory-driven rationale for diversification and 
risk sharing in equities is still neutralised by risk-
aversion caused by information asymmetries. It 
might indeed be argued that access to timely and 
highly specific information is critical for the 
proper monitoring of an equity portfolio.  
                                                     
23  Portes, R. and H. Rey (2005), 'The determinants of cross-
border equity flows', Journal of International Economics, 
Vol. 65, pp. 269-296. 
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Graph 21: Change in equity home bias for euro-area 
Member States (in %) 
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Source: Commission services. 
5.  Conclusion 
Risk sharing has increased in the euro area 
according to econometric evidence. The capital 
market channel has seen the biggest impact, and 
the euro area has developed specific features in 
this regard distinguishing it from patterns 
observed between other OECD countries. 
However, channels to smooth out economic 
shocks remain much weaker than in the United 
States, which benefits from a large federal budget 
and fully integrated credit and capital markets. 
Current estimations need to be interpreted with 
caution and the analysis would benefit from 
further refinement as sufficient retrospective data 
become available.  
While quite substantial, the deepening of cross-
border financial flows within the euro area has 
been asymmetric, with much progress in debt 
securities and less in equities. This could explain 
why the increase in risk sharing within the euro 
area has been slow. There is therefore still a large 
untapped potential for risk sharing derived from 
stronger cross-border equity flows. Reforms 
aimed at achieving full and effective financial 
integration in the euro area should be pursued. 
They should not only cover approximation of 
banking and financial market legislation, but 
should also tackle other dimensions of the 
financial system performance, including aspects 
of transparency and how financial information is 
disseminated, corporate governance and the 
protection of minority shareholders, effective 
and rapid enforcement of contracts, effective 
application of competition and anti-trust 
principles and, last but not least, homogeneous 
financial supervision across euro-area countries. 
Full and consistent implementation of the 
Financial Services Action Plan measures would 
contribute to this objective in the coming years. 
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Focus 
III. The resilience of the euro-area economy 
This focus section sheds light on the resilience of the euro-area economy, i.e. its capacity to weather adverse economic shocks. 
Over the past four decades, the euro-area economy has seen four major downturns which, with the notable exception of the 
recession of the 1970s, were followed by a protracted period of considerable underutilisation of resources as gauged by the 
persistence of large negative output gaps. Recoveries have also tended to be slower in the euro area than in the US. However, 
this seeming lack of resilience should be put in its proper perspective. First, there are indications that the trend decline in the 
volatility of growth is pursuing its course, resulting in milder downturns. Second, there have been signs of improved resilience in 
some segments of the economy in the latest downturn, with business investment and employment performing better than in the 
recessions of the 1980s and 1990s. Third, while the euro area and the US may have differed in the pace of their recoveries 
from major previous downturns, they typically suffered similar cumulated losses in the output gap.  
One important source of the euro- area’s increased resilience since the inception of EMU has been an improved macroeconomic 
framework. Stable inflation expectations, low real interest rates and stable nominal intra-area exchange rates have supported 
domestic demand in the latest downturn. There is also some evidence that fiscal policy has become less pro-cyclical in bad times 
than in the past, although insufficient consolidation during the good times of the late 1990s constrained the room for 
manoeuvre in the subsequent downturn in several Member States.  
Despite ongoing structural reforms, the euro-area economy still suffers from excessive rigidities in a number of areas. However, 
while these rigidities are clearly weighing on the economy's production potential, their impact on the economy's resilience seems 
to depend both on the nature of the shocks and the type of rigidities considered. For instance, there is some evidence that price 
rigidities may reduce economic resilience in the face of supply shocks but the relation does not hold for other types of rigidities 
and shocks. Differences in price rigidities may partly help explain why the US economy returned to potential faster than its 
euro-area counterpart after the downturn of the early 2000s, but other factors, particularly a stronger contribution to growth 
by technology in the US, have probably played a more significant role. 
1.  Introduction 
This focus section seeks to shed some light on 
the resilience of the euro-area economy. 
Resilience is here defined in broad terms as the 
capacity of the economy to adjust to adverse 
economic shocks. The concept therefore covers 
two dimensions: the degree to which the 
economy can dampen the initial impact of a 
shock and the speed with which it returns to 
trend after the shock.  
From a policy perspective, efforts to better 
understand the factors that govern the response 
of an economy to shocks and, ultimately, the 
determinants of cyclical fluctuations can be 
justified on at least two grounds. First, business 
cycle fluctuations have welfare implications. 
Whereas early work by Robert Lucas24 tended to 
downplay the welfare costs of the business cycle, 
more recent work, in particular by Galí et al., has 
emphasised its possible significant effect on 
welfare in economies characterised by price and 
                                                     
24  Lucas, R. (1987), 'Models of business cycles', Oxford 
University Press. 
wage rigidities and other frictions.25 Second, 
protracted periods of growth below potential 
may engender hysteresis effects, particularly in 
terms of unemployment, and thereby weigh on 
the economy's long-term growth performance. 
This focus examines the resilience of the euro-
area economy by means of a two-pronged 
approach combining a descriptive analysis of the 
euro-area business cycle with model simulations. 
Section 2 sets the stage by identifying some 
stylised facts of the euro-area business cycle. 
This is achieved by comparing the latest cycle 
both to its predecessors of the 1980s and 1990s 
and to the US business cycle. Fluctuations of 
activity around potential depend on the nature 
and the strength of the shocks affecting the 
economy, but also on the structure of the 
economy (e.g. the degree of price and wage 
rigidity or of employment flexibility) and the 
response of macroeconomic policies. Section 3 
                                                     
25  Galí, J., M. Gertler and J.D. López-Salido (2007), 
'Markups, gaps, and the welfare costs of business 
fluctuations', Review of Economics and Statistics, February, 
Vol. 89(1), pp. 44-59.  
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takes a first (mostly descriptive) look at the 
respective roles of these three factors in 
explaining the specificities of the latest euro-area 
cycle in relation both to the past and to the US. 
The contributions of economic structures and 
macroeconomic policies can, however, only be 
properly disentangled in an econometric model. 
Section 4 therefore presents simulations of the 
response of the euro-area and US economies to 
various shocks based on an estimated DSGE 
model. Section 5 concludes.  
2.  The latest downturn and recovery in 
perspective 
The latest euro-area cycle shares similarities 
with previous cycles… 
This section compares the response of the euro-
area economy to the latest downturn with 
previous ones and the US cycle.26 This is done 
by extracting the business cycle from quarterly 
GDP with an HP filter. According to the output 
gap series thus obtained, the euro-area economy 
has experienced four major downturns over the 
past four decades. These downturns followed 
cyclical peaks in, respectively, 1973Q4, 1980Q1, 
1991Q4 and 2000Q4.  
Graph 21: Output gap developments during major 
downturns, euro-area (in %) (1) 
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(1) Four major downturns were identified with an HP filter for the 
1970-2006 period. Successive cyclical peaks are 1973Q4, 1980Q1, 
1991Q4 and 2000Q4. 
Source: Commission services. 
                                                     
26  An important caveat should be noted here: caution 
should be exercised in comparing cycles over time for 
the euro area as a whole since it only really existed during 
the latest cycle.  
Graph 21 compares the developments of the 
euro-area business cycle during these major 
downturns by depicting developments in the 
output gap following the cyclical peak for a 
period of 24 quarters (i.e. the time elapsed since 
the latest peak in 2000Q4). With the exception 
of the recession of the 1970s, the last three 
major downturns clearly share strong similarities. 
All of them were characterised by a long period 
of output gap deterioration, aborted pick-ups in 
activity and delayed recoveries and, altogether, 
protracted periods of output below potential. 
Moreover, a look at the components of GDP 
shows that the pattern of recovery was fairly 
similar, with exports being the first component 
of GDP to pick up, followed by investments and 
finally by consumption.  
… but the downturn of the early 2000s was 
milder than its predecessors  
While the most recent cycle is similar to its two 
predecessors on a number of accounts, the 
downturn of the early 2000s was significantly 
less pronounced than its predecessors, with the 
cyclical trough less deep and the negative gap 
absorbed faster. While in the previous two cycles 
output remained below potential for 26 quarters, 
only 16 quarters were needed to close the output 
gap in the most recent cycle (Table 4). As a 
result, the cumulated losses in the output gap 
totalled 3% of GDP in the downturn of the early 
2000s against 6-7.5% in the two previous cycles.  
The moderation of losses in activity in the latest 
downturn compared with its predecessors is in 
line with a well-documented trend decline in 
business cycle volatility in industrialised 
countries. While previous analysis has shown 
that the biggest fall in the volatility of output 
growth in the euro area took place in the 1970s 
and 1980s, developments in the most recent 
cycle suggest that the trend decline in volatility is 
pursuing its course.27 This could be an indication 
that the negative shocks hitting the euro-area 
economy have been milder than in the past. 
However, it could also be evidence of improved 
resilience.   
                                                     
27  See Focus Section on 'The reduced volatility of output 
growth in the euro area', Quarterly Report on the Euro 
Area, Vol. 6, No 1 (2007).  
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The euro-area and US business cycles are 
more similar than generally thought 
Graph 23 compares output gap developments 
after the latest cyclical peak in the euro area 
(2000Q4) and the US (2000Q2). Some 
differences are conspicuous and well-known. 
The fall in the output gap was sharper and 
significantly more rapid in the US than in the 
euro area. The trough of the cycle was reached 
much earlier in the US than in the euro area and 
was followed by a stronger recovery. The US 
cycle was not subject to 'false dawns', which 
appear to be a feature of the euro-area cycle.  
Graph 23: Output gap developments after the cyclical 
peak of 2000, euro-area and US (in %) (1) 
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(1) Business cycle peaks are respectively 2000Q4 for the euro area 
and 2000Q2 for the US. 
Source: Commission services. 
Beyond these differences, however, the euro-
area and US cycles share a number of 
similarities. Table 4 shows that both the 
cumulated losses in the output gap and the 
number of consecutive quarters with a negative 
gap in downturns have converged over time: the 
cumulated output gap losses in the two 
economies were actually very close during the 
latest downturn. So, while losses have typically 
been somewhat higher in the US, the difference 
narrowed significantly in the downturn of the 
early 2000s. Similarly, the two economies 
experienced periods of negative output gaps of 
similar length in the previous two downturns. 
Overall, this suggests that, although the US 
benefits from faster and stronger recoveries than 
the euro area, in terms of overall losses in 
activity, this advantage tends to be offset by a 
more pronounced downturn following negative 
shocks. This illustrates the complexity of the 
concept of resilience and suggests that there may 
be a trade-off between its two dimensions: the 
capacity of the economy to dampen the initial 
impact of shocks and its capacity to recover 
swiftly thereafter.   
Table 4: Two indicators of the severity of 
downturns (1) 
 1980s 1990s 2000s Average 
Number of consecutive quarters with a negative gap 
EA 26 26 16 23 
US 11 27 15 18 
Sum of consecutive negative output gaps 
(in % of GDP) 
EA -7.6 -5.8 -2.7 -5.4 
US -8.5 -7.1 -3.0 -6.2 
(1) Downturns following peaks in, respectively, 1980Q1, 1991Q4 
and 2000Q4. 
Source: Commission services. 
Investment was a source of resilience in 
domestic demand in the latest cycle… 
While trade developments in the euro area were 
relatively similar in the past three downturns, 
domestic demand was clearly more resilient in 
the downswing of the early 2000s (Graph 24), as 
growth in final domestic demand (excluding 
inventories) decelerated less markedly in the 
early 2000s than at similar stages of previous 
cycles and was also faster to recover.  
Graph 24: Domestic demand after the cyclical peak, 
euro area (index 100 at cyclical peak) (1) 
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(1) Excluding inventories. 
Source: Commission services. 
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This apparent increase in the resilience of final 
domestic demand can be entirely traced back to 
investment. Capital formation was less severely 
affected in the contraction phase of the cycle 
than in similar stages of previous cycles. It also 
recovered faster, and growth during the upturn 
was stronger and more stable (Graph 25). Unlike 
in other cycles, investment during the latest cycle 
recovered from the downturn as fast as exports. 
It also posted a considerably less brutal cyclical 
downturn as a share of GDP in the euro area 
than in the US, a gain which the sluggishness of 
the recovery did not entirely cancel out.28 
The relative buoyancy of investment in the latest 
cycle can be attributed to non-residential 
investment (i.e. investment in equipment and in 
non-residential construction) rather than 
residential. This contrasts with the US where 
residential investment has been a major driver of 
capital formation since the early 2000s.  
Graph 25: Investment after cyclical peaks, euro area 
(index 100 at cyclical peak) 
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Source: Commission services. 
A factor which has contributed to the relative 
strength of capital formation in the latest 
downturn is the resilience of public investment. 
Reflecting needs to consolidate public finances, 
spending on public investment contracted 
markedly during the recessions of the 1980s and 
1990s. For instance, public investment as a share 
of GDP dropped from 3.2% in 1991 to 2.6% in 
1995, contributing for more than a fourth to the 
fall in the total investment share during that 
period – public investment only represents 15% 
                                                     
28  In 2006, the investment share was back at its 2000 peak 
in the euro area, but still below its 2000 peak in the US. 
of total capital formation. In contrast, reflecting 
a healthier overall position of public finances, 
the share of public investment in GDP remained 
broadly stable in the early 2000s.  
… consumption, however, was 
disappointing 
Consumption also behaved somewhat differently 
during the latest cycle in the euro area. Growth 
in household spending was slightly stronger 
during the early stages of the downturn than 
during similar stages of previous cycles. 
However, the opposite holds for the upturn and, 
six years after the cyclical peak, average 
consumption growth looks very similar for the 
three cycles (Graph 26).  
Graph 26: Consumption after cyclical peaks, euro area 
(index 100 at cyclical peak) 
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Source: Commission services. 
This is striking in view of the comparatively 
buoyant growth in household disposable income 
and employment over the latest cycle in 
comparison with its predecessors (Graph 27). 
However, positive developments in disposable 
income were offset by a pro-cyclical rise in the 
households savings ratio in the early 2000s. 
Hence, despite the ongoing deepening and 
integration process in European financial 
markets, the degree of consumption smoothing 
as measured by fluctuations in the savings ratio 
was actually lower in the latest cycle than during 
its predecessors. Estimated consumption 
functions suggest that traditional determinants 
of consumption (disposable income and wealth) 
do not fully account for the weakness of private 
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consumption in the early 2000s.29 A possible 
alternative explanation is that concerns about the 
sustainability of pension systems or declining 
productivity may have led households to reassess 
their income prospects, leading to a negative 
consumption shock that aggravated the 
downturn of the early 2000s. 
Graph 27: Household real disposable income after 
cyclical peaks, euro area (index 100 at cyclical peak) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
 
 
Graph 28: Cyclical component of consumption after 
cyclical peaks in 2000, euro area and US (in %) (1) 
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(1) Cyclical peaks on the basis of output gaps: 2000Q4 for the euro 
2000Q2 for the US.  Consumption is detrended with an HP filter. 
Source: Commission services. 
In the latest cycle, euro-area consumption was 
also weak compared to the US. Graph 28 
compares developments in private consumption 
                                                     
29  See for instance 'Explaining the weakness of private 
consumption in the euro area', Quarterly Report on the 
Euro Area, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2004).  
in the two regions after the cyclical peak of 2000. 
To facilitate comparison, the graph displays the 
cyclical component of consumption in both 
regions.30 The consumption downturn was more 
protracted in the euro area than in the US where 
the cyclical trough was reached much earlier. 
Consumption in the US was also much faster to 
recover and has now been above its trend level 
for some time. In contrast, consumption in the 
euro area has still not yet fully recovered from 
the downturn.   
3.  A first look at the role of policies, 
shocks and structures 
A more supportive policy mix than in 
previous downturns… 
One element which has helped dampen output 
losses in the euro area in the latest downturn 
compared with its predecessors is a substantially 
more supportive policy mix. Although this may 
partly reflect more global developments such as 
the so-called great moderation, it is also clearly a 
benefit of the EMU macroeconomic framework.  
Graph 29: Real short-term interest rates during major 
downturns, euro area (in %) (1)  
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(1) 3-month interest rate deflated by the consumption deflator. 
Source: Commission services. 
The ECB's success in anchoring inflation 
expectations has been conducive to a particularly 
favourable monetary stance in the latest 
downturn with short-term real interest rates 
                                                     
30  This is obtained by extracting the cycle from quarterly 
consumption data with an HP filter. 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 35 - 
about 2 to 3 pp lower than during the recession 
of the 1980s and the 1990s (Graph 29).31 A 
similar, although slightly smaller, gap was 
registered for long rates. In addition, the positive 
effect of supportive financial conditions on 
domestic demand was reinforced by the stability 
of intra-area nominal exchange rates brought 
about by the single currency. Intra-area exchange 
rate stability has allowed to avoid the pro-cyclical 
rises in interest rates that were necessary in some 
Member States in the past to fend-off 
speculative attacks on currencies.  
More supportive financial conditions and stable 
intra-area nominal exchange rates could be one 
explanation for the comparative resilience of 
investment noted in the previous section. This 
would also be in line with a well-documented 
stylised fact according to which investment is the 
main transmission channel of monetary policy in 
the euro area.32 
Graph 30: Discretionary fiscal policy in major 
downturns, euro area  
(cyclically adjusted primary balance in %) (1) 
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(1) Y0 corresponds to the year of the cyclical peak preceding the 
downturn. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
                                                     
31  Estimates of monetary conditions combining 
developments in short-term real interest rates and in the 
real exchange rate yield a similar favourable picture of 
monetary conditions in the latest downturn.  
32  See Angeloni, I., A. K. Kashyap, B. Mojon and 
D. Terlizzese (2003), 'The output composition puzzle: a 
difference in the monetary transmission mechanism in 
the euro area and US', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
Vol. 35, pp. 1265-1306. 
To a lesser degree, fiscal policy was also more 
supportive in the latest downturn. The two 
recessions of the 80s and 90s took place in a 
period of significant (in some countries two-
digit) deficits. Hence, in order to control a 
spiralling situation of increasing deficit and debt 
levels, fiscal policy was practically forced to turn 
contractionary while the downturns were 
unfolding and output gaps turned negative. 
Graph 30 shows the clear pro-cyclical 
development of the discretionary component of 
fiscal policy during the recessions of the early 
1980s and early 1990s. In contrast, discretionary 
fiscal policy was mildly counter-cyclical in the 
early stages of the latest downturn. The 
comparative resilience of public investment in 
the latest downturn is another indication of an 
improved fiscal stance.  
The observation that the fiscal stance was 
somewhat better in the latest downturn than 
during its predecessors is also in line with 
empirical studies showing that fiscal policy has 
tended to be frequently pro-cyclical in euro-area 
Member States over the past decades but that 
budgetary corrections became less common in 
bad times after the completion of EMU.33 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding this progress, 
budgetary policy has so far tended to remain 
pro-cyclical in good time since the inception of 
the euro. In some Member States, insufficient 
consolidation during the good times of the late 
1990s thus constrained the room for manoeuvre 
in the subsequent downturn.   
… but the policy easing in 2001-03 was less 
pronounced in the euro area than in the US 
In both the euro area and the US, the 
macroeconomic policy stance was clearly 
counter-cyclical during the downturn of the early 
2000s, though the fiscal and monetary stimuli 
were smaller in the euro area. Between 2000 and 
2003, budget balances deteriorated by 6.5 pp in 
the US and 3.1 pp in the euro area. Over the 
same period, real short-term rates dropped by 
more than 500 basis points in the US and only 
300 basis points in the euro area.  
                                                     
33  See European Commission (2006), 'Public finance in 
EMU', European Economy No. 3. 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area III/2007 
 
 
 
- 36 - 
These differences in macroeconomic stimulus 
should however be put in their proper 
perspective.  
The more aggressive easing of macroeconomic 
policies in the US in the early 2000s was partly 
justified by a much sharper deterioration in the 
output gap in the early stages of the downturn 
than in the euro area.  
Regarding fiscal policy, the deterioration in the 
US government budget mostly reflected a set of 
tax cuts enacted in the early 2000s. Unlike in the 
euro area, automatic fiscal stabilisers played only 
a limited role in the drop in fiscal balances.34 It is 
worth stressing, however, that the large 
discretionary fiscal stimulus in the US was largely 
a 'happy coincidence' reflecting tax measures 
that had been planned before the downturn and 
were not specifically designed to be counter-
cyclical. It also vindicates some of the objections 
traditionally raised against the use of fiscal 
activism, since this stimulus did in fact cause a 
large deterioration of the US fiscal position that 
has proved difficult to reverse. After several 
years of a positive output gap, the US budget 
balance is still clearly negative and accumulated 
deficits have led to a substantial increase in the 
level of public debt. The lack of a solid surplus 
position will seriously limit future room for 
manoeuvre in the event of an economic 
downturn. 
Regarding monetary policy, four points are 
worth stressing.  
First, the more muted response of short-term 
interest rates in the euro area than in the US was 
justified by differences in economic conditions. 
To a large extent, the sharper monetary 
loosening by the Fed represents a response to a 
sharper cyclical loss in output and more 
favourable inflation developments in the early 
2000s. This conclusion is backed by econometric 
                                                     
34  Fiscal stabilisers tend to have a bigger cyclical smoothing 
role in the euro area than in the US. Empirical estimates 
suggest that automatic stabilisers are significantly larger 
in the euro area than in the US. According to OECD 
estimates, the elasticity of the budget balance to the 
output gap is 0.48 in the euro area and only 0.34 in the 
US (see Girouard, N. and C. André (2005), 'Measuring 
cyclically adjusted budget balances for OECD countries', 
OECD Economics Department Working Paper 
No. 434.). 
evidence, discussed in the next section, which 
shows that differences in interest rate 
developments between the euro area and the US 
cannot be explained by differences in monetary 
reaction functions.35  
Second, nominal and real short-term rates were 
significantly higher in the US than in the euro 
area at the peak of the cycle in 2000. If nominal 
rates had been cut in the euro area by the same 
degree as in the US between 2000 and 2001, they 
would have entered negative territory.  
Third, a distinction should be made between 
developments in short-term interest rates and 
overall financial conditions. The response of 
short rates to deteriorating cyclical conditions at 
the beginning of the decade was sharper in the 
US than in the euro area but the gap was 
significantly smaller for overall financial 
conditions as real long-term interest rates have 
followed broadly similar paths in the two 
regions.  
Finally, although monetary reaction functions 
are probably broadly similar in the two regions, 
there is some evidence that US monetary policy 
has benefited from a more powerful housing 
transmission channel in recent years. The 
comparative strength of housing investment and 
private consumption in the US relative to the 
euro area in the latest cycle provides some 
support for this conclusion. There is also 
evidence that housing wealth effects are stronger 
in the US than in the euro area and that housing 
equity withdrawal provided a considerable boost 
to US consumption in the early 2000s.36 The 
strength of the housing transmission channel 
could be related to a number of factors, 
including the degree of liberalisation of mortgage 
markets, tax systems and land supply.37 
                                                     
35  A similar conclusion is reached in Sahuc, J.G. and 
F. Smets (2006), 'Differences in interest rate policy at the 
ECB and the Fed: an investigation with a medium-scale 
DSGE model', forthcoming in Journal of Money Credit and 
Banking.  
36  See Catte, P., N. Girouard, R. Price and C. André (2004), 
‘Housing markets, wealth and the business cycle’, OECD 
Economics Department Working Paper No. 394 (7 
December). 
37  For a discussion of these factors see Hoeller, P. and D. 
Rae (2007), 'Housing markets and adjustment in 
monetary union', OECD Economic Department 
Working Paper No. 550 (April).  
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Nevertheless, the recent US experience suggests 
that a stronger housing channel may also raise 
the risk of housing booms, house-price 
imbalances and financial turbulence.  
A cycle partly shaped by two major 
structural shocks  
The response of the euro-area economy to the 
latest downturn must be understood against the 
background of two powerful structural shocks 
(one positive, one negative) which began to 
affect the economy already in the 1990s.  
On the positive side, the economy benefited 
from a sharp pick-up in employment and labour 
supply as past structural reforms and wage 
moderation began to bear fruit (Graph 31).  
Graph 31: Trend growth in productivity and 
employment, euro area  
(y-o-y growth in %, 1980Q1 to 2006Q4)  
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Source: Commission services. 
On the negative side, the euro-area economy 
experienced a well-documented slowdown in 
trend productivity which began around the mid-
1990s and, despite some possible signs of 
improvement in the past two years, now leaves 
the economy with still only a moderate pace of 
productivity growth compared to historical 
trends.  
These structural shocks have affected the 
economy in a number of ways. Employment has 
proved to be much more resilient in the current 
cycle than previous ones with unemployment 
showing only a modest increase during the 
downswing. The strength of employment 
growth was also the main cause of comparatively 
stronger growth in household real disposable 
income. In the meantime, the deteriorating 
productivity performance weighed on real wage 
growth and may have led households to reassess 
their long-term income prospects, thereby 
contributing to the comparatively less supportive 
developments in the savings ratio during the 
latest cycle.  
What role for labour and product market 
rigidities?  
Standard macroeconomic theory predicts that 
differences in the level of regulation of goods 
and labour markets have a clear impact on the 
level of output and employment. However, 
economic theory is ambiguous regarding the 
impact of rigidities in labour and product 
markets on the response to shocks. Some forms 
of rigidities may dampen the initial impact of a 
shock but lengthen the ensuing adjustment 
phase.38 In this case, the trough will be less 
pronounced than in a more flexible economy 
but the period of negative output gap will be 
longer, leading to either smaller or larger 
cumulated output losses than in a more flexible 
economy.  
Econometric panel analysis provides some 
backing for a link between resilience and 
economic structures, particularly those features 
of financial markets that have a bearing on 
monetary policy transmission.39 However, it is 
not easy to disentangle the respective roles of 
differences in labour and product market 
rigidities, macroeconomic policies and economic 
shocks in explaining cyclical differences between 
the euro area and the US. The next section will 
seek to do so on the basis of a set of simulations 
carried out with DSGE models. 
 
                                                     
38  For example, strict employment protection may delay the 
response of employment to a shock, thereby mitigating 
the initial impact of the shock on consumption while 
delaying the necessary adjustment process. See Duval, R., 
J. Elmeskov and L. Vogel (2007), 'Structural policies and 
economic resilience to shocks', a paper presented at the 
workshop on 'Structural reforms and economic 
resilience: evidence and policy implications', OECD, 14 
June 2007. 
39  See Duval, R. et al. (2007).  
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4. Analysing the role of shocks and 
economic structures with a DSGE model 
Significant differences in nominal and real 
rigidities between the euro area and the US 
Simulations shown in this section are based on 
two DSGE models for the euro area and the US. 
The models were estimated over the same 
sample period (1978Q1 to 2006Q1).40 
The models embody significant structural 
differences between the two economies (see 
Table 5). In particular: 
¾ US firms adjust prices more often than their 
euro-area counterparts. The average 
duration over which euro-area firms keep 
prices fixed is about 5 quarters, while US 
firms adjust prices on average every 1.6 
quarters.  
¾ Nominal wage rigidities as measured by the 
average length of wage contracts are similar 
in the US and in the euro area. There are, 
however, significant differences in the 
elasticity of labour supply. A significantly 
higher elasticity in the US translates into a 
                                                     
40 For a detailed description of the models, see Ratto, M., 
W. Roeger and J. in't Veld. (2006), 'Fiscal policy in an 
estimated open economy model for the euro area', 
European Commission, Economic Papers, No. 303.  
smaller response in US wages to changes in 
employment.41  
¾ Labour adjustment costs are higher in the 
euro area than in the US. Administrative 
costs related to a rise in employment 
amount to about 18% of total additional 
wage costs in the euro area and only 10% in 
the US.  
¾ There is little evidence of differences in 
capital adjustment costs and financial 
market frictions (as measured by the share 
of liquidity constrained households).  
¾ The estimated monetary reaction functions 
do not point to sizeable differences in 
monetary policy behaviour in response to 
inflation and activity.  
But the link between these rigidities and 
resilience is complex 
Simulations with the DSGE model show that 
the link between the degree of real and nominal 
rigidities on the one hand and resilience of the 
economy to shocks is complex (see Box 4). No 
general conclusions can be drawn as the results 
seem to be highly shock-specific and dependent 
on the type of rigidity considered. In particular,  
                                                     
41 This is consistent with DG ECFIN's Phillips curve 
estimates which also show a stronger response of wages 
to unemployment in the euro area than in the US. 
Table 5: Main estimated structural parameters in the euro-area and the US DSGE models 
 Euro area US 
Nominal rigidities: 
Avg. duration between price adjustments (in quarters) 5 1.6 
Avg. wage contract length (in quarters) 5.6 5.8 
Real rigidities: 
Labour adjustment cost (in % of total additional wage costs) 18 10 
Labour supply elasticity 0.34 1.25 
Capital adjustment cost 23 33 
Investment adjustment cost 16 12 
Consumption: 
Share of liquidity constrained consumers (in %) 63 76 
Coefficients in monetary policy reaction functions: 
Lagged interest rate 0.86 0.90 
Inflation 0.32 0.50 
Output gap  0.03 0.04 
Output gap(-1) 0.16 0.19 
Source: Commission services. 
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Box 4: How do structural rigidities affect adjustment to shocks? 
 
The DSGE models can be used to analyse how differences in rigidities in the euro area affect its adjustment to 
shocks. This can be achieved by simulating the response of the euro-area to shocks and comparing these base 
simulations with those resulting from a modified model where structural parameters are set sequentially to their (less 
rigid) US values. The simulation exercise focuses on labour market and price rigidities because these are the areas 
where important differences between the US and the euro area were identified during the estimation process. The 
three main rigidities analysed are: (i) differences in labour adjustment costs; (ii) differences in labour supply elasticity; 
and (iii) differences in price rigidity. In order to illustrate the role played by these rigidities, simulation experiments 
are conducted for stylised TFP and world demand shocks (taken as prototypical for supply and demand shocks). 
 
The simulation experiments show that differences in labour adjustment costs mainly affect the response of 
employment and real wages but have little impact on the size and speed of adjustment of GDP. For example a 
positive productivity shock reduces employment temporarily. Employment falls more when adjustment costs are 
smaller. On the other hand, real wages increase more with lower adjustment costs. Therefore the net effect on 
consumption is similar and there is no significant difference in the GDP response. In the case of an increase in world 
demand, employment will be affected positively. This effect will be stronger with lower labour adjustment costs. 
Also real wages will be higher with lower adjustment costs. Both effects lead to a slightly stronger rise in domestic 
demand when labour demand is less rigid and therefore to slightly higher GDP. Overall, however, differences in 
labour adjustment costs only entail modest differences in the impact of world demand shocks on GDP. 
 
Real wages in an economy with high labour supply elasticity such as the US economy respond less to a 
productivity shock. However, the accompanying reduction in employment is not any smaller than it would be if the 
labour supply elasticity were lower. On the contrary, employment decreases more in the case of a higher labour 
supply elasticity because the more muted increase in real wages leads to a more muted increase in consumption. 
However, lower real wage growth increases investment and compensates the shortfall in consumption. The net effect 
on GDP is negligible. In the case of a world demand shock, a higher labour supply elasticity results in wage inflation 
responding more strongly to the change in employment. However, the effect is small and does not show up in GDP.  
 
In contrast to the other rigidities, differences in price rigidity can potentially generate differences in adjustment 
patterns in the case of supply/productivity shocks. A fast price reaction can indeed cushion the negative employment 
response and therefore allow the supply shock to be more expansionary on impact. A rapid fall in prices leads to a 
faster increase in real wages which in turn supports an increase in aggregate demand. With higher nominal rigidities, 
the adjustment of employment is delayed since it takes longer for prices to decline to their new equilibrium level, 
leading to a shortfall of aggregate demand over the transition period. 
 
 Euro-area GDP response to a TFP shock: euro area 
versus US price rigidity 
(deviations from baseline in %) (1) 
Euro-area GDP response to a world demand shock: euro 
area versus US price rigidity  
(deviations from baseline in %) (1) 
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(1) Price rigidity is measured in terms of average duration between 
price adjustments. See Table 5. 
Source: Commission services. 
(1) Price rigidity is measured in terms of average duration between 
price adjustments. See Table 5. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
As shown in the first graph, when the euro-area coefficient of price rigidity (as measured by the average duration 
between price adjustments) is replaced by its US values, the initial GDP gains from the TFP shock are higher. The 
economy also becomes more resilient in the sense that output returns to baseline more rapidly and cumulated output 
deviations are smaller (6.6% of GDP vs. 5.4% of GDP). However, as shown in the second graph, this response 
pattern is confined to productivity shocks. In the case of demand shocks, higher price flexibility can help cushion the 
initial impact of these shocks although at a cost of a slower return to baseline.  
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the premise that a less rigid economy responds 
both more strongly and faster to shocks does 
not, in general, find support in these simulations. 
An important exception, however, is the 
response of GDP to technology shocks. In this 
case, an economy with more flexible prices 
clearly responds faster and shows a higher 
degree of resilience: output growth returns to 
trend more rapidly and cumulated deviations of 
output from trend are smaller. The better 
response to shocks, however, is only observed 
for supply shocks. In the model, nominal price 
rigidities do not seem to affect significantly 
differences in response to demand shocks. 
Overall, it seems that the link between structural 
rigidities and dynamics is not as strong or clear-
cut as the link between structural rigidities and 
the level of output and employment. 
Nevertheless, some rigidities, particularly 
nominal rigidities, may have an impact on 
adjustment dynamics. 
Technology shocks are key to explaining 
differences in resilience between the euro 
area and the US 
These model simulations reveal that one factor 
which may partly explain why the US economy 
recovered faster than its euro-area counterpart 
from the 2001 downturn is the US economy’s 
better response to a negative TFP shock. Both 
the US and the euro area experienced a sharp 
decline in TFP after 2000, but the greater price 
flexibility in the US may partly explain why it 
recovered faster. 
Nevertheless, a more critical factor in explaining 
the faster recovery in the US is the difference in 
the TFP growth profile between the US and the 
euro area since the beginning of the decade. TFP 
growth in the US has been more robust and 
recovered more quickly after the slowdown, 
while the euro area experienced a prolonged 
period of subdued TFP growth after 2001. 
Graph 32 shows the importance of these 
differences in TFP profile by comparing the 
actual GDP growth in the euro area over the 
2000-06 period with the growth which would 
have occurred (according to the model) if the 
euro area had benefited from the more 
favourable TFP developments registered in the 
US. This simulation shows that technology 
shocks go a long way towards explaining the 
relative sluggishness of the euro-area recovery. 
Additional simulations (not shown here) were 
also carried out in which the shocks to external 
demand and monetary policy registered in the 
US were applied to the euro area. These show 
that neither differences in shocks in world 
demand nor differences in monetary policy 
shocks have contributed significantly to growth 
differentials between the euro area and the US 
since the beginning of the decade.  
Graph 32: Euro-area GDP growth – actual and 
assuming US TFP developments  
(y-o-y changes in % –2000Q1 to 2006Q1) (1) 
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(1) Counterfactual growth is obtained by simulating the euro-area 
DSGE model with US TFP shocks for the 2000Q1 to 2006Q1 
period.  
Source: Commission services. 
5. Conclusion 
Over the past four decades, the euro-area 
economy has experienced four major downturns 
which, with the notable exception of the 
recession of the 1970s, share strong similarities: 
relatively protracted falls in output gaps, sluggish 
recoveries marked by relapses and, overall, 
drawn-out periods of negative output gaps. 
Recoveries have tended to be much slower in 
the euro area than in the US (although 
downturns have generally been less pronounced 
in the euro area). This, a priori, points to a 
relatively weak capacity to respond to economic 
shocks. This conclusion should, however, be 
nuanced as there have also been signs of 
improved resilience in recent years. First, output 
gap losses in the latest downturn were 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 41 - 
substantially smaller than in the past. Second, 
there have been some signs of improved 
resilience in some segments of the economy in 
the present decade, with business investment 
and employment performing better than in 
previous downturns. Third, differences between 
the US and the euro area should not be 
overemphasised as the two regions also share 
important features. In particular, total output 
gap losses and the total duration of sub-par 
activity appear to be broadly similar in the US 
and the euro area. This reflects the fact that 
although the US economy tends to recover from 
negative shocks more rapidly than the euro area, 
their initial impact also tends to be stronger.  
Cyclical differences either across time or across 
countries depend on a number of factors, 
including some differences in macroeconomic 
policies, in labour and product market rigidities 
and in the nature of economic shocks.  
In the current decade, the euro area has 
benefited from an improved macroeconomic 
framework. This is particularly clear for 
monetary policy which has been more 
supportive to growth in the latest downswing 
than in previous ones Furthermore, thanks to 
the fiscal adjustment taken during the 90s, euro-
area fiscal policy was somewhat less pro-cyclical 
in the latest downturn than during the recessions 
of the 1980s and the 1990s although insufficient 
consolidation in the period of good times of the 
late 1990s constrained room for manoeuvre in 
some Member States.  
Notwithstanding some progress in structural 
reforms, the euro-area economy remains less 
flexible than its US counterpart. While rigidities 
clearly weigh on the euro-area economy's 
production potential, their impact on the 
economy's resilience is less clear-cut and 
depends on their nature and the nature of 
shocks. Model simulations suggest that, while 
nominal rigidities clearly hamper the resilience to 
supply shocks, the relation is less clear-cut in the 
case of other forms of rigidities or other types of 
shocks.  
Finally, model simulations also suggest that 
differences in TFP shocks have been an 
important source of differences in growth 
profiles between the US and the euro area since 
the beginning of the decade. While both regions 
suffered from a TFP slowdown in the early 
2000s, the US’s faster TFP recovery has 
contributed to a faster recovery of its overall 
economy. Hence, milder technology shocks 
could be the main explanation for the US 
economy's relatively fast return to potential 
compared with the euro area after the downturn 
of the early 2000s.  
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http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers284_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 285.  
Sven Langedijk and Martin Larch (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
Testing the EU fiscal surveillance: How sensitive is it to variations in output gap estimates? 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers285_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 286.  
Christian Buelens, Gaëlle Garnier, Roderick Meiklejohn (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs)  
and Matthew Johnson (U.K. Office of Fair Trading)  
The economic analysis of state aid: Some open questions 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/2007/economicpapers286_en.htm 
 
3. Regular publications  
Euro area GDP indicator (Indicator-based forecast of quarterly GDP growth in the euro area) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/euroareagdp_en.htm 
Business and Consumer Surveys (harmonised surveys for different sectors of the economies in the European 
Union (EU) and the applicant countries)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys_en.htm 
Business Climate Indicator for the euro area (monthly indicator designed to deliver a clear and early assessment 
of the cyclical situation) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessclimate_en.htm 
Key indicators for the euro area (presents the most relevant economic statistics concerning the euro area)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/key_euro_area/keyeuroarea_en.htm 
Monthly and quarterly notes on the euro-denominated bond markets (looks at the volumes of debt issued, the 
maturity structures, and the conditions in the market) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/bondmarkets_en.htm 
Price and Cost Competitiveness 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/priceandcostcompetiteveness_en.htm 
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V. Key indicators for the euro area 
 
1 Output 2004 2005 2006 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -4.7 -7.3 2.3 6.0 6.6 5.8 6.1 5.0 4.9
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 2.1 1.3 4.0 0.6 -0.9 1.0 -0.1 -- --
  2004 2005 2006 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch 2.0 1.5 2.8 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.3
2 Private consumption 2004 2005 2006 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -13.9 -13.8 -9.0 -4.4 -4.0 -1.3 -1.9 -1.8 -3.1
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 1.5 1.2 2.0 0.6 -0.1 -0.8 0.6 0.1 --
  2004 2005 2006 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 
 Private consumption 2.3 Qtr. % ch 1.5 1.5 1.8 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5
3 Investment 2004 2005 2006 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 81.6 81.3 83.0 82.0 82.5 83.6 83.9 84.4 84.8
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch 1.9 2.8 5.3 0.6 2.7 0.7 1.7 2.0 -0.2
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP 0.1 0.2 -- 0.0 0.3 0.2 -- -- --
4 Labour market 2004 2005 2006 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.8 8.6 7.9 7.1 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.9 --
   2004 2005 2006 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 0.9 0.8 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 --
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 2.4 2.3 3.8 2.8 3.1 4.4 5.0 5.0 6.1
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.2 --
5 International transactions  2004 2005 2006 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -13.2 -15.6 -1.1 5.0 5.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 4.0
 World trade 5.2 Index 146.2 157.0 172.3 181.1 177.8 182.6 -- -- --
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 1148.3 1241.0 1382.0 122.4 122.6 122.7 -- -- --
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 1075.1 1224.4 1394.0 117.3 119.4 119.6 -- -- --
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR 73.1 16.6 -12.1 5.1 3.1 3.0 -- -- --
   2004 2005 2006 06Q1 06Q2 06Q3 06Q4 07Q1 07Q2 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 6.9 4.3 8.0 3.1 1.6 1.1 3.1 0.8 1.1
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 6.7 5.1 7.7 2.2 1.3 1.9 1.6 0.9 0.6
   2004 2005 2006 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR 60.8 -1.8 -9.7 6.0 -1.6 -7.8 5.9 -- --
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -68.6 -210.0 -158.7 -5.9 -24.5 -13.4 -44.8 -- --
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR 72.9 146.1 263.5 65.6 15.6 5.0 70.2 -- --
6 Prices  2004 2005 2006 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 --
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 1.9 3.5 4.4 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.3 1.8 --
 Import prices6.4 Index 97.2 104.8 112.9 111.8 112.7 112.7 -- -- --
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2004 2005 2006 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 2.0 2.1 2.9 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 4.1 3.4 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.5 4.3
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 2.0 2.0 2.8 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 2804.6 3207.1 3793.3 4070.5 4337.0 4445.4 4470.2 4449.0 4220.6
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 5.8 7.4 8.5 11.0 10.3 10.6 10.9 11.7 --
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 6.0 8.1 11.0 10.6 10.4 10.4 10.8 11.0 --
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 1.2 1.2 1.3 115.0 116.0 116.1 115.5 116.2 115.7
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Total employment, domestic concept, seasonally and working day adjusted Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Wages and salaries. Labour cost index, industry and services (excluding 
public administration), nominal, working day adjusted  
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 World trade Volume, 1998=100, seasonally adjusted CPB 
5.3 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.4 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.5 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.6 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.8 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions; before 1997 partly 
estimated 
ECB 
5.9 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
5.10 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit value index for goods, 2000=100  Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Ecowin 
7.2 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Ecowin 
7.3 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Ecowin 
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Ecowin 
7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro-area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
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7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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